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INTRODUCTION
Discovery receives short shrift in the law school curricu-
lum. Although students are introduced to the subject in a first
year course on Civil Procedure, the "bathtub effect" usually
takes its toll by graduation day. That is, after the first year,
the plug is pulled and the student's knowledge drains away.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1969, J.D. 1976, The
Ohio State University.
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Moreover, it is difficult to teach discovery in third year pro-
grams on trial advocacy. Too much emphasis on discovery and
pretrial would leave too little time for instruction on the
mechanics of the actual trial. Even the experienced practi-
tioner may not remember all the intricacies of discovery and
may find it helpful to have a practical source of authority
which is sufficiently concise to be carried in a briefcase for
easy reference.
This Article is intended to serve the needs of both the
beginning student and the experienced practitioner. It was
written to serve as both an introduction to and a refresher on
discovery in Kentucky. With this goal in mind, the author has
deliberately drawn on cases that are of practical and tactical
significance.
The reader will find that many federal cases have been
cited throughout the Article. Amendments to the Kentucky
Civil Rules (CR)1 have brought discovery in state courts
largely in line with that available in federal courts.2 Thus, fed-
eral case law provides helpful guidance to the Kentucky prac-
titioner in selecting and using discovery devices.
However, while this Article primarily discusses those ar-
eas where Kentucky and federal law are similar with respect
to discovery, some significant differences in the two bodies of
law still exist. For example, Kentucky courts have taken a
conservative approach in interpreting the Kentucky Civil Rule
regarding the scope of permissible discovery.3 As a result, a
Kentucky judge may be more likely than a federal judge to
rely upon the pleadings as a starting point to determine the
permissible bounds of discovery.4
In addition, the Kentucky rules governing the use and
taking of depositions contain several peculiarities. One is that
the deponent's signature is automatically waived in Kentucky
I See generally Ky. R. Civ. P. 26.01.-37.05 [hereinafter cited as CR] (Kentucky's
discovery rules).
2 See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 [hereinafter cited as FRCP] (federal discov-
ery rules).
I CR 26.02 describes the scope of permissible discovery in Kentucky.
4 Compare Carpenter v. Wells, 358 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Ky. 1962) with Oppen-
heimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
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state courts in the absence of a request for the signature.5
Similarly, the Civil Rules provide a trap for the unwary by
stipulating that if a party could have subpoenaed and deposed
a nonparty witness and offered the deposition in lieu of his
testimony, but failed to do so, then it might not be possible to
compel the witness's personal attendance at the trial.6
In September of 1982, the Kentucky Supreme Court
launched an experimental program involving a wide variety of
new rules to be applied in designated circuit courts.7 The ex-
perience gleaned from this program may eventually lead to
additional amendments in the Kentucky Civil Rules. The
Court has already adopted a new rule limiting the number of
interrogatories and requests to admit which may be served
without permission from the court.8 The practitioner all too
frequently discovers these and other differences the "hard
way.))
I. GENERAL RULES REGARDING DIScOVERY
A. Types and Purposes of Discovery
The formal discovery devices available in civil cases
include:
[a] depositions upon oral examination or written
questions;
[b] written interrogatories;
[c] production of documents or things or permission to
enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other
purposes;
[d] physical or mental examinations; and
s See CR 30.05. Contra FRCP 30(e) (witness and parties must waive requirement
that deposition be submitted to witness for his or her signature). For a discussion of
the Kentucky rule, see text accompanying notes 128, 158-59 infra.
' See CR 45.05. For a discussion of this rule, see text accompanying note 117
infra.
See Special Rules of the Circuit Court for the Economical Litigation Docket,
CR 88-97 (known as the "fast track rules" because of their potential to speed up the
discovery process). For a discussion of these rules, see text accompanying notes 346-
70 infra. See also Note, Economical Litigation: Kentucky's Answer to High Costs
and Delay in Civil Litigation, 71 Ky. L.J. 647 (1982-83).
8 See CR 33.01(3) (effective Jan. 1, 1984). See also CR 93.02.
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[e] requests for admissions.9
However, counsel should always remember that discovery in a
less formal sense can be obtained at the various stages of a
proceeding by the following devices:
(i) the motion for summary judgment;
(ii) the motion for a preliminary injunction;
(iii) proceedings to attach property;
(iv) the subpoena power; and
(v) early pretrial conferences to enlarge their discovery."0
B. Scope of Discovery or Examination
CR 26.02, like its federal counterpart, provides that dis-
covery may be had of "any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending ac-
tion."'1 A second sentence provides: "it is not ground for ob-
jection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the
trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."' 2
As one commentator has noted, many courts fail to sepa-
rate these two sentences, and allow wide ranging discovery of
anything that "might arguably lead to the discovery of admis-
sible evidence."'" However, a more logical reading of the rule
is that "relevancy to the subject matter of the litigation' 4 is
the threshold test of permissible discovery.' 5 In other words,
the second sentence deals only with objections to the discov-
ery of evidence that would be inadmissible at trial. Inadmissi-
bility of the "stepping-stone" information sought should not
block an inquiry if the party seeking the information can show
9 CR 26.01.
10 G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS 361 (1978); See also W.
BARTHOLD, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE DISCOVERY TECHNIQUES 32-33 (1975) (dis-
cussing summary judgment as a method of discovery).
,1 CR 26.02(1). See FRCP 26(b)(1) for the analogous federal provision.
12 CR 26.02(1).
"' See G. VETTER, SUCCESSFUL CIVIL LITIGATION 110 (1977).
14 Admittedly, relevancy to the "subject matter" allows for greater discovery
than relevancy to the "issues raised in the pleadings." See J. MOORE, W. TAGGART &
J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 26.56(1) (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE].
15 G. VETTER, supra note 13, at 110.
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that discovery of the inadmissible matter "appears reasonably
calculated to lead to" the discovery of other relevant and ad-
missible evidence. 16 One item which is discoverable even
though it is inadmissible at trial is the existence and contents
of any insurance agreement that might satisfy part or all of a
judgment. 17
Kentucky courts appear to favor the more conservative
reading of the rule. While discovery is not limited to the pre-
cise issues as drawn in the pleadings,' the pleadings are a
good starting point for a determination of relevancy. Wide
ranging inquiries should not be permitted solely on a claim
that the information sought might possibly lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence.' 9
Evidence that is privileged in the evidentiary sense is not
discoverable. 20 However, while a claim of privilege may justify
an instruction to a witness not to answer a specific question or
interrogatory, 21 such a claim will not ordinarily justify a re-
fusal to participate in discovery.2 For example, a party to a
civil action may rely upon the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, and refuse to answer specific questions propounded to
him. However, the party invoking the privilege must invoke it
in response to specific interrogatories or deposition questions,
and may not, for example, simply refuse to attend a
deposition.23
10 For example, both hearsay and opinion testimony, taken over objection to its
admissibility at trial, will frequently lead to other relevant, and admissible evidence.
See Carrier Mfg. Co. v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Wis. 1968);
Lowe's of Roanoke, Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 219 F. Supp. 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
17 CR 26.02(2). Insurance agreements are.now expressly discoverable under CR
26.02(2). However, Kentucky courts permitted their discovery even before the rule
was amended to provide expressly for such discovery. See Maddox v. Grauman, 265
S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
"8 See Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d at 939. See also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc.
v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
,9 See Carpenter v. Wells, 358 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1962) (inquiry must be sensibly
relevant to investigation).
20 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
2' See CR 26.02(1).
22 See Quinn v. Petto, 84 F.R.D. 104 (M.D. Pa. 1979); Guy v. Abdulla, 58 F.R.D.
1 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
21 See Quinn v. Petto, 84 F.R.D. at 104; Guy v. Abdulla, 58 F.R.D. at 1. Many
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C. Sequence and Timing of Discovery
Civil Rule 26.04, like Federal Rule (FRCP) 26(d), does
not impose any order of priority in the sequence and timing of
discovery, either as to which party may proceed first, or as to
which method of discovery must be employed first.24 A party
is permitted to utilize the various discovery devices in any or-
der, and discovery need not be delayed merely because the
opposing party is already conducting discovery.25 However,
the court has the power under CR 26.04 to intervene on mo-
tion and then structure the discovery of a case "for the conve-
nience of parties and witnesses, and in the interests of jus-
tice. '' 26  This flexible rule allows discovery to proceed
extrajudicially, while providing for judicial intervention and
control in appropriate cases.
Whether counsel should strike first or await the adver-
sary's discovery will, of course, depend on the facts of the
given case. Many counsel will opt for an early deposition of
the opposing party to pin down that party to a particular ver-
sion of the facts before the testimony of other witnesses is dis-
closed. On the other hand, some counsel believe that much
can be learned from the other party's discovery, and that one
should "make haste slowly."2 The important point is that the
question of timing should be taken seriously in each case.
With respect to the order in which specific discovery de-
vises should be employed, the sequence of discovery must be
tailored to the individual needs of the case. Typically, inter-
rogatories are employed to discover the existence of docu-
ments, witnesses, and other evidence in the possession of the
lawyers are unaware of the fact that in civil cases, an adverse inference may be drawn
from the invocation of this particular privilege. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.
308, 318 (1976); Henricksen v. Henricksen, 486 F. Supp. 622, 628-29 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
24 See CR 26.04. But see CR 95 (creating both a sequence and a time limitation
for certain discovery methods for those circuits subject to the Special Rules for the
Economical Litigation Docket).
25 CR 26.04.
26 Id.
27 Similarly, many attorneys argue that a motion for summary judgment may
provide a measure'of early discovery, and they recommend deferring the deposition of
the adverse party until such a motion has been resolved. See W. BARTHOLD, supra
note 10, at 53-54.
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adverse party, followed by a request for production of any
tangible evidence revealed by the responses to the interroga-
tories. After examining the relevant documents and tangible
evidence, counsel may then depose the adverse party and wit-
nesses, or proceed to contact third party witnesses informally.
Counsel may, however, choose to depose the adverse
party before using interrogatories in order to catch that party
unprepared, and pin the party down to a favorable version of
the facts. Because the adverse party may be more candid in
the course of a deposition than in response to interrogatories,
counsel may also use this opportunity to discover the exis-
tence of other witnesses and tangible evidence. Much sage ad-
vice for particular types of cases is available in the literature
of discovery,28 and counsel should consider all the available
options rather than proceeding in a mechanical fashion.
D. Protective Orders and the Work Product Doctrine
CR 26.03 (protective orders) 29 and CR 26.02(3) (trial
preparation materials) are general provisions relating to legiti-
mate resistance to discovery. CR 26.03 tempers the liberal
right of discovery given by CR 26.02. Either a party or the
person to be examined may move "seasonably"30 after being
served with a notice of deposition, or other discovery device,
and show "good cause" for a protective order.31 The motion
may be made in the court in which the action is pending or in
the court in the judicial district in which the deposition is to
be taken.3 2 In the author's view, the mere filing of a motion
should not stay the examination. The movant should be re-
quired to obtain the protective order or an order postponing
2'8 See, e.g., id.; G. VETrER, supra note 13.
'0 CR 26.03 provides for protective orders after a notice for discovery has been
made, but before discovery has begun. CR 30.04, which provides for the termination
and limitation of examinations at oral depositions, is discussed at notes 139-44 infra
and accompanying text. CR 93.04 of the Special Rules appears to modify the protec-
tive order system, and make some inroads into the "work product" doctrine.
30 A motion may be seasonable almost any time up to the date set for the exami-
nation. Dictograph Prods. v. Kentworth Corp., 7 F.R.D. 543 (W.D. Ky. 1947).
31 CR 26.03.
32 Id.
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the deposition pending a hearing on the motion.33 Otherwise,
a party could unilaterally and willfully delay or evade discov-
ery. 4 The trial court may exercise wide discretion to protect
litigants and witnesses from discovery abuse;35 hence what
constitutes "good cause" will vary, depending upon "the na-
ture and character of the information sought ... weighed in
the balance of the factual issues involved in each action."36
Under the protective order system, the court may protect
a party or other person from "annoyance, embarrassment, op-
pression, or undue burden or expense ' 37 by ordering:
(a) that discovery not be had;
(b) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms
and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(c) that the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking
discovery;
(d) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the
scope of discovery be limited to certain matters;
(e) that discovery be conducted with no one present ex-
cept persons designated by the court;
(f) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by
order of the court;
(g) that a trade secret or other confidential research, de-
velopment, or commercial information not be disclosed or be
disclosed only in a designated way; [or]
(h) that the parties simultaneously file specified docu-
ments or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court.38 If a motion for a protective
order is denied, the court may order the moving party or per-
son to provide or permit the discovery sought, and may award
" Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 269 (9th Cir. 1964).
34 Id.
" See Gevedon v. Grigsby, 303 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Ky. 1957); Armstrong v. Biggs,
302 S.W.2d 565, 568-69 (Ky. 1957). See also Annot., 70 A.L.R.2D 685 (1960) (contains
a collection of cases dealing with FRCP 30(b) and similar state statutes).
38 Glick v. McKesson & Robbins, 10 F.R.D. 477, 479 (W.D. Mo. 1950). For a
thorough discussion of "good cause," see Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 28 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 32,557 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
37 CR 26.03(1).
38 CR 26.03(1)(a)-(h).
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expenses pursuant to CR 37.01(4).39
Although a court may order that "the discovery not be
had," there must be a "strong showing" that such a drastic
measure is required before discovery will be prohibited or
stayed.40 On the other hand, a court will be justified in deny-
ing or staying discovery if the process is being used to delay or
disrupt a proceeding or the adversary's preparation for trial.41
In addition, discovery may be stayed pending decision on mo-
tions under CR 12,42 the resolution of which would moot the
need for discovery on the merits of the pending action.43 A
claim of undue hardship, 44 harassment,45 or a valid claim of
privilege 46 may also justify an order that discovery not be had,
or that discovery be postponed.
Protective orders seeking a change in the time or place
for the taking of depositions are frequently necessitated by at-
torneys who "short-notice" their opponents,47 or attempt to
39 CR 26.03(2).
40 Kamin v. Central States Fire Ins. Co., 22 F.R.D. 220 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
41 Cf. Britton v. Garland, 335 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1960) (depositions taken two
weeks prior to trial allowed, absent any attempt to harass). But see Spangler v.
Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 10 F.R.D. 591 (E.D. Tenn. 1950) (depositions allowed
to be taken even though first notice filed only 10 days prior to trial).
42 See Gevedon v. Grigsby, 303 S.W.2d at 282. See also Wright, Discovery, 35
F.R.D. 39, 60 (1964) (court may stay discovery until jurisdictional challenges solved).
43 Cf. Armstrong v. Biggs, 302 S.W.2d at 565 (trial court abused its discretion in
denying a motion for a stay of discovery where a decision on the merits was imminent
in a federal action involving the same issues). However, if a motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction is filed, a court may permit discovery on that issue, and sanc-
tion the litigant who fails to permit discovery. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compa-
gnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
44 See, e.g., Rosanna Knitted Sportswear, Inc. v. Lass O'Scotland, Ltd., 13 F.R.D.
325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (request to examine four principal officers, bookkeeper, and
sales manager, in addition to "omnibus subpoena duces tecum" abuses discovery
process).
45 M.A. Porazzi Co. v. The Mormaclark, 16 F.R.D. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (deposi-
tion of high corporate officer knowing nothing about the transaction disallowed by
court under FRCP 30(b)).
46 See, e.g., Schilling-Hiller S.A. Indus. & Commercial v. Virginia-Carolina
Chem. Corp., 19 F.R.D. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (attorney-client privilege sufficient to
prohibit examination of defendant's attorney by plaintiff). A claim of privilege usu-
ally does not justify nonappearance. Instead the deponent must appear and assert a
privilege to specific questions as they are propounded. See Guy v. Abdulla, 58 F.R.D.
at 1.
'. See, e.g., Stover v. Universal Molded Prods. Corp., 11 F.R.D. 90, 91 (E.D. Pa.
1950) (fixing deposition date two days after service renders notice invalid); Spangler
1983-84]
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depose nonparty witnesses at places where they are not re-
quired to attend.48 Moreover, a location that is properly
named in a notice of deposition may be changed on motion to
suit the convenience of others, although this may be condi-
tioned on the payment of travel expenses by the party seeking
the change.4 e
CR 26.03(1)(c), which provides for court orders changing
the method of discovery to one other than that selected by the
party seeking discovery, gives some measure of relief against
"wall street" interrogatories." In addition, a court may order
that some alternative to an oral deposition be used based on
considerations of health,5 ' travel expenses,52 or distance to be
traveled. 53 On motion, the court may use this rule to limit ini-
tially the scope of examination to keep the inquiry within rea-
sonable bounds, to that which has "substantial relevancy to a
sensible investigation."'54 However, it seems more appropriate
that such a motion be made under CR 30.04, after the deposi-
tion has commenced and after a record of bad faith or oppres-
sion has been substantiated.5
v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. at 591 (time between notice date
and deposition not reasonable); Crowley v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 70 F.
Supp. 547, 552-53 (W.D.S.C. 1947) (defendant not allowed to examine plaintiff two
days before trial); Adams v. Letcher County, 184 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Ky. 1944) (three
days not adequate when deponent resides 267 miles away).
'$ Deep South Oil Co. v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 21 F.R.D. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
49 Moore v. George A. Hormel & Co., 4 F.R.D. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
50 See, e.g., In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 74 F.R.D. 497 (S.D. Cal. 1975);
Barouh Eaton Allen Corp. v. IBM, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,255 (N.Y. App. Div.
Mar. 16, 1980). Amendments to FRCP 26, giving the court greater control of the
method of discovery, are discussed in Underwood, Curbing Litigation Abuses: Judi-
cial Control of Adversary Ethics-The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 625
(1982).
51 Patrick v. Eastern S.S. Line, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
52 Kurt M. Jackmann Co. v. Hartley, Cooper & Co., 16 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
" Hyam v. Am. Export Lines, Inc., 213 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1954).
54 Carpenter v. Wells, 358 S.W.2d at 526. Courts are reluctant to grant Rule 26
motions in advance of the taking of depositions on grounds of irrelevancy. See Aacon
Contracting Co. v. Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, 175 F. Supp. 659
(E.D.N.Y. 1959). Likewise, courts ordinarily will not limit the length of the examina-
tion in advance. Pentel v. AT&T, 16 F.R. Serv. (Callaghan) 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
" Cf. Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (no show-
ing of bad faith made).
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While CR 26.03(1)(e) provides for the exclusion of per-
sons from the taking of a deposition on a showing of "good
cause," 56 it should not be understood as authorizing the court
routinely to exclude the parties or their officers or counsel, or
others whose presence is necessary for a proper
interrogation.
Courts are necessarily careful to protect the interests of
litigants and others in access to and the dissemination of rele-
vant information discovered in the course of litigation. CR
26.03 provides for the sealing of depositions to be opened only
upon order of the court, nondisclosure of trade secrets, and
simultaneous filing of documents in sealed envelopes.58 In
some cases, confidential business information5 9 or sensitive
personal information 60 has been protected by such expedients.
However, courts have occasionally displayed considerable def-
erence to competing first amendment interests.' With respect
to trade secrets the court will usually order disclosure subject
to a protective order against unnecessary use or
dissemination.2
CR 26.03(1) is intended to protect parties or other per-
" CR 26.03(1)(e). Exclusion may be had in order to protect confidential informa-
tion. See, e.g., Uinta Oil Ref. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 36 F.R.D. 176 (D. Utah
1964). The rule may also be used to "sequester" witnesses. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Read-
ing Co., 30 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Counsel may also exclude strangers and news
media representatives from civil discovery proceedings. See 80 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 353
(June 25, 1980). Accord Times Newspaper Ltd. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 387 F.
Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1974). But cf. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979)
(reporter's attendance allowed at pretrial judicial proceeding).
V See Williams v. Electronic Control Sys., Inc., 68 F.R.D. 703, 704 (E.D. Tenn.
1975). But see Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir. 1973) (party excluded to
protect deponent from embarassment and ridicule); Beacon v. R.M. Jones Apartment
Rentals, 79 F.R.D. 141 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (holding that it is "clear" that Federal Rule
26(c)(5) authorizes the exclusion of parties).
CR 26.03(f)-(h).
Marshwood v. Jamie Mills, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 386 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
6o Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Alter, 106 F. Supp. 316 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
" See Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 32,557.
Cf. 80 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. at 353 (press may "publish information however ob-
tained"). But see Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, - U.S.- , 52 U.S.L.W. 4612
(1984) (protective order prohibiting a litigant from publishing information obtained
in pre-trial discovery, based on a "good cause" showing, does not violate the First
Amendment).
62 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 14, at 26.75.
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sons from unreasonable "annoyance, embarrassment, oppres-
sion, or undue burden or expense;" but requiring a witness's
absence from work, even for a substantial period of time, has
not been viewed as unreasonable.6 A nonparty must usually
be content with statutory witness fees and mileage allowances,
although several recent cases have required more significant
compensation in exceptional cases. 4 In one case the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a pro-
tective order conditioning discovery on payment of production
expenses.6 5
CR 26.03(3)(a), like FRCP 26(b)(3), codifies the work
product doctrine first announced in Hickman v. Taylor.6 The
work product rule provides a limited privilege of nondisclo-
sure to avoid the "'demoralizing' effects on the adversary
function of lawyers 61 7 that might result if a party could "sit
back and secure. . . the fruits of his opponent's. . . prepara-
tion."68 In order for the work product privilege to apply, it is
83 See Michels v. Ripley, 1 F.R.D. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (deposition requiring wit-
ness's absence from work for substantial time not unreasonable); Goldberg v. Raleigh
Mfrs., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 975 (D. Mass. 1939) (deposition requiring witness's absence
from work not unreasonable).
6 In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
669 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. CBS, 666 F.2d 364 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1118 (1982).
" In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
669 F.2d at 623.
66 329 U.S. 495 (1947). CR 26.02(3)(a) provides:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under paragraph (1) of this Rule and prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other
party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemni-
tor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and
that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall pro-
tect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning
the litigation.
(emphasis added).
11 J. LEVINE, DiscovERY 11 (1982).
68 Id. For collected cases see annot., 41 A.L.R. FED. 123 (1979); Annot., 35 A.L.R.
3D 412 (1971).
[Vol. 72
DISCOVERY IN KENTUCKY
not always necessary that a lawsuit have been filed. 9 More-
over, once the rule has come into play, protection is afforded
to any document or thing, and some courts have stretched the
doctrine beyond the language of the rule to prevent disclosure
of oral communications between the attorney and his wit-
nesses relating to trial preparation."
Assuming that a party is seeking the production of docu-
ments and things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party, or by or for that other party's
representative, it must be remembered that the rule only pro-
tects the documents or things themselves, and not the facts
contained therein. In other words, a party seeking discovery is
not precluded from securing the facts contained in the pro-
tected documents by way of independent discovery. For exam-
ple, assume a party's counsel or agent 1 has secured witness
statements from the available witnesses. The opposing party
seeking discovery then may examine such witnesses as to any
facts the witnesses know, including facts contained in the wit-
nesses' statements, even though production of the statements
may not be obtained absent the showing required by the
rule.72
Although such "work product" is privileged, the privilege
is qualified. If the party seeking discovery demonstrates that
he has "substantial need" of the privileged matter, and is "un-
able without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means, '7 3 then he may
Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 43 (D. Md. 1974). See Miles v.
Bell Helicopter, 385 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (fact that litigation already com-
menced is not dispositive of work product privilege applicability, where materials
were prepared in the ordinary course of business).
70 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 512-13; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473
F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973); In re Rosenblum, 401 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). While a
third party witness may voluntarily relate conversations with an attorney disclosing
otherwise protected "mental impressions," he may not be required to do so on deposi-
tion. Ford v. Phillips Elecs. Instruments Co., 82 F.R.D. 359 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
71 The protected document need not have been obtained by an attorney. Al-
maguer v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 55 F.R.D. 147 (D. Neb. 1972); Bunting v. Gains-
ville Mach. Co., 53 F.R.D. 594 (D. Del. 1971). See also Alexander v. Swearer, 642
S.W.2d 896 (Ky. 1982).
7'2 See CR 26.02(3)(a).
73 Id. (emphasis added).
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have at least some of the material sought. The qualification
"at least some of the material" must be added due to the lan-
guage of the rule requiring the protection of the "mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attor-
ney or other representative. 7 4 A recent opinion of the United
States Supreme Court dealing with work product left unan-
swered the question of whether the special protection of
"mental impressions" is absolute." Presumably, redaction
would be a feasible alternative in many cases.76
There are exceptions to the work product rule. Specifi-
cally, a party may obtain a copy of his own statement without
a showing of need and hardship." Similarly, a nonparty may
obtain his statement on request.78 It has been held that the
work product privilege is not lost by a sharing between clients
with common interests."' However, work product protection
may be waived at trial where counsel attempts to make testi-
monial use of the materials.8 0
E. Discovery of Facts and Opinions of Experts
Prior to the amendment of the Civil Rules on October 1,
1971, Kentucky courts severely limited pretrial discovery of
the "impressions, opinions or conclusions" of experts.,' How-
ever, CR 26.02(4)(a)(i), as amended, now tracks the language
of FRCP 26(b)(4), and presumably provides the same discov-
74 Id.
7' See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
"6 See Xerox Corp. v. IBM, 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But see Duplan Corp.
v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974) (the protection
was held to be absolute).
7 CR 26.02(3)(b).
7'8 The request must be made by the witness. For example, there is no require-
ment that a party's counsel give a deponent his prior statement at the request of
opposing counsel. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 82, at 559 (4th ed. 1983).
71 See United States v. AT&T, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,533, at 76,868
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 16, 1980); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146,
1172 (D.S.C. 1974).
80 See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-40 (1975). Cf. Prucha v. M & N
Modern Hydraulic Press Co., 76 F.R.D. 207 (W.D. Wisc. 1977) (document used to
refresh recollection prior to deposition).
"' See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Zipper, 502 S.W.2d 74, 80 (Ky. 1973). Counsel
should note that CR 89-97 have greatly expanded the scope of discovery relating to
experts for those circuits using the special rule.
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ery that is available in federal practice. Because of the dearth
of case law interpreting this amendment, the Kentucky practi-
tioner must, for the time being, rely primarily on federal cases
construing the federal counterpart of the Civil Rule.
Discovery may be sought from an expert either because
he was personally involved in a particular event, or because he
has acquired facts or developed opinions about the event, "in
anticipation of litigation or for trial." 82 Any information an
expert holds by virtue of his being an actor in, or witness to,
the events underlying the litigation may be obtained by depo-
sition without the permission of the court. 3 However, CR
26.02(4)(a)-(b) establishes certain guidelines governing discov-
ery from experts who develop opinions in anticipation of liti-
gation. Discovery of these opinions is limited regardless of
whether the expert is expected to testify at trial, 4 but the ex-
tent of the limitation is related to this expectation.
If the expert will be called as a witness at trial, CR
26.02(4)(a)(i)-(ii) establishes a two step discovery process.8 5
First, the party seeking information may inquire by way of
interrogatories as to the identity of such an expert and the
subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify. 6
Such interrogatories may require a statement of "the sub-
stance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is ex-
pected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opin-
ion. Until this procedure is exhausted, the expert may not
82 CR 26.02(4). In some instances, the expert may have acquired some informa-
tion as a "mere witness" and other information as "an expert ... in anticipation of
litigation or for trial." See, e.g., Sochanchak v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 28 F.R.
Serv.2d (Callaghan) 362 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
Some courts have construed the phrase "in anticipation of litigation" narrowly.
See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. 943, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Thomas
Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367, 372 (N.D. Iln. 1972). But
see In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979) (federal discovery rules
not applicable to grand jury subpoenas).
83 Tahoe Ins. Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 84 F.R.D. 362, 363 (D. Idaho 1979);
Nelco Corp. v. Slater Elec., Inc., 80 F.R.D. 411, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Harasimowicz v.
McAllister, 78 F.R.D. 319, 320 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 70 F.R.D.
326, 332 (D.R.I. 1976).
84 CR 26.02(4)(b).
85 See Annot., 33 A.L.R. FED 403, 455 (1977).
" See CR 26.02(4)(a)(i).
87 Id.
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be deposed as a matter of course.8 When this procedure is
exhausted, an expert may be deposed only with the permis-
sion of the court, subject to the payment of fees or expenses,
as appropriate, 9 unless the parties agree to a different
procedure.90
A party is under a duty to seasonably supplement re-
sponses to interrogatories requesting the identity of experts to
be called as witnesses at trial, and the subject matters and
substance of the expert's expected testimony.91 Accordingly, a
party may not "sandbag" his opponent by failing to identify
an expert until just before trial.92 Although further discovery
may be granted on motion,93 there are no hard and fast rules
for judges and litigants to use in determining when such a mo-
tion should be granted.
The purpose of the two step procedure is to prevent a
party from avoiding the cost of retaining his own expert,94
while recognizing that in some cases, at least, a deposition of
the opponent's expert, or other discovery, may be a prerequi-
site to effective cross-examination. 5 Moreover, the court
should ordinarily condition discovery on the payment of such
fees and expenses of the opponent as the court deems appro-
priate. 6 Because of this, the courts need not take an overly
restrictive view of the availability of other discovery, if the in-
itial interrogatories provide insufficient discovery in a given
88 See United States v. John R. Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
" See United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 78, 81
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Rupp v. Vock & Weiderhold, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 111, 113 (N.D. Ohio
1971).
90 Pearl Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1136-38
(S.D. Tex. 1976). Courts have resisted applying doctrines of waiver, where the party
seeking discovery has not obtained a court order prior to seeking "other" discovery.
United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 72 F.R.D. at 83; Breadlove v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202, 204-05 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
9' CR 26.05.
92 See Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1975). Hicks v. Cole,
566 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), should not be read to the contrary.
93 CR 26.02(4)(a)(ii).
9 Herbst v. ITT Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528, 530 (D. Conn. 1975); Kozar v. Chesapeake
& 0. R.R., 320 F. Supp. 335, 375 (W.D. Mich. 1970), modified, 449 F.2d 1238 (1971).
11 Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 74 F.R.D. 594, 595 (D. Conn. 1977).
96 CR 26.02(4)(a)(ii), (c).
[Vol. 72
DISCOVERY IN KENTUCKY
case.
97
If an expert has been retained or specially employed by
another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for
trial, but is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, CR
26.02(4)(b) mandates that discovery may not be had except
"upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it
is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts
or opinions on the same subject by other means," or as pro-
vided in CR 35.02 (relating to examining physicians).9" Dis-
covery in these cases is not limited to interrogatories, and the
two step procedure governing discovery from experts who are
expected to testify is inapplicable. These protections are un-
necessary because CR 26.02(4)(b) has its own prophylactic
character. The philosophy of the rule is that discovery from
such experts is "unfair," absent "a showing of exceptional cir-
cumstances"99 and some provision for the sharing of fees and
expenses.
Similarly, the federal counterpart to CR 26.02(4)(b) was
adopted to abolish the notion that an expert's information is
always protected as "privileged" or "work product," and to in-
sert in its place a doctrine of "fairness."' 100 A number of fed-
eral courts have held that the name, address and other identi-
fying information relating to a nontestifying, consulting
expert may be obtained by interrogatories, as a matter of
course. 101 However, further discovery would require a showing
of exceptional circumstances. If the party can obtain compa-
rable information in other ways, or does not make a sufficient
showing of the need for further discovery or its value in
resolving the issues of the case, the courts will deny further
97 See Annot., supra note 85, at 403. But see Wilson v. Resnick, 51 F.R.D. 510,
511 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (expert's report not discoverable where interrogatories are
complete).
CR 26.02(4)(b).
For a recent Kentucky case on "exceptional circumstances," see Big Sandy
Wholesale, Inc. v. Conley, 639 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1982).
100 See Pearl Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. at 1122.
101 See, e.g., Arco Pipeline Co. v. SIS Trade Star, 81 F.R.D. 416, 417 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Baki v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179, 182 (D. Md. 1976). But see
Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training School, 622 F.2d 496, 503 (10th Cir. 1980)
(such information is not discoverable).
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discovery.102
II. DEPOSITIONS
A. Taking Depositions
Because depositions play a critical role in the preparation
of lawsuits it is appropriate that deposition procedures be dis-
cussed in some detail.10 3 The procedural steps for the taking
of depositions are set forth in CR 27.01 through CR 31.02.104
The mechanics for setting up and taking an ordinary deposi-
tion upon oral examination are straightforward, but are none-
theless frequently honored in the breach.
"A party desiring to take the deposition of any person
upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing
to every other party to the action. ' 10 5 This requirement has
some "teeth," because a deposition can ordinarily be used
only against a party who knew of the deposition and had an
opportunity to attend. 0 6 A notice to a party deponent may be
accompanied by a Rule 34 document request, 107 while a non-
party deponent may be required to produce documents by
way of a subpoena duces tecum108 Leave of court is not re-
102 See Crockett v. Virginia Folding Box Co., 61 F.R.D. 312, 320 (E.D. Va. 1974)
(did not show sufficient need); Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Lumberman's Mut.
Casualty Co., 60 F.R.D. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (could obtain comparable information).
See also Annot., supra note 85, at 465-68. But see Pearl Brewing Co. v. Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. at 1137 ("substantial need" test inappropriate). For
a case allowing discovery, see Big Sandy Wholesale, Inc. v. Conley, 639 S.W.2d at 778.
103 For additional guidance, see W. BARTHOLD, supra note 10; D. DANNER, PAT-
TERN DEPOSITION CHECKLISTS (1973); G. VETTER, supra note 13; Blumenkopf, Deposi-
tion Strategy and Tactics, 5 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 231 (1981). Counsel should note
that the Special Rules severely restrict depositions of non-party witnesses. See text
accompanying notes 347-49, infra.
.0. CR 27.01-.02 relate to pre-action discovery by deposition, and depositions
pending appeal. CR 28.01-.03 state the persons before whom depositions may be
taken. CR 29 sets out the stipulations regarding discovery procedure. Rules 30.01-.07
concern depositions by oral examination, and CR 31.01-.02 relate to the taking of
depositions upon written questions.
205 CR 30.02(1).
10I See text accompanying note 153 infra. Similarly, CR 30.02(2)(b) provides that
if a party shows that he was unable through the exercise of diligence to obtain coun-
sel to represent him at the deposition, then it may not be used against him.
107 CR 30.02(5).
108 CR 30.02(1).
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quired, unless a plaintiff seeks to depose a party prior to the
expiration of thirty days after service of the summons upon
any defendant. 10 9 Even in such instance, the plaintiff need not
obtain leave of court if a defendant has already sought discov-
ery" or if the notice states (and the facts stated support the
proposition) that the person to be examined is about to go out
of the state and will be unavailable for examination unless his
deposition is taken before expiration of the thirty day
period."'
"Reasonable notice" suggests that a party be given a rea-
sonable opportunity to prepare for, travel to, and participate
in the deposition. Due regard must be given to the conve-
nience and prior engagements of counsel." 2 Although deposi-
tions may be set up informally, it is prudent to confirm such
arrangements with a written notice." 3
The notice of deposition is sufficient to compel attend-
ance of a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
corporate party." 4 However, a nonparty must be subpoenaed
pursuant to CR 45.04. 5 A subpoena should be served on a
nonparty witness even if the witness has agreed to appear at a
deposition without such compulsion. If the witness fails to ap-
pear and no subpoena was served, the opposing party may be
109 CR 30.01.
110 CR 30.01(b).
m CR 30.02(2)(a)(i)-(ii). A false statement is punishable under CR 11.
Armstrong v. Biggs, 275 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Ky. 1955). See also Adams v. Letcher
County, 184 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Ky. 1944) (pre-rules case). The court may, for cause,
enlarge or shorten the time for taking the deposition. CR 30.02(3).
"I Cf. Thomas v. Thomas, 497 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1973) (where an oral agreement
is disputed, the court need not resolve the dispute but should instead require compli-
ance with the rule).
114 CR 37.04(1). See Collins v. Wayland, 139 F.2d 677, 678 (9th Cir. 1944). If a
party fails to respond to such notice, a court may order him to appear and may im-
pose sanctons. Sublett v. Hall, 589 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Ky. 1979). "[S]ervice of notice on
an attorney for a party is sufficient to make it incumbent upon that party to appear
for a deposition." Marriott Homes, Inc. v. Hanson, 50 F.R.D. 396, 399-400 (W.D. Mo.
1970).
Il' Mere employees or stockholders of a corporation likewise must be served with
a subpoena. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. Distillers Co., 19 F.R.D. 169 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); Krause v. Erie R.R, 16 F.R.D. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Counsel should note that
"[a] resident of the state may be required to attend an examination only in the
county wherein he resides or is employed or transacts his busfiess in person, or at
such other convenient place as is fixed by an order of the court." CR 45.04(3).
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awarded fees and expenses incurred in attending the aborted
deposition.116 Counsel should also note that CR 45.05 contains
a trap for the unwary. Specifically, if a party could have sub-
poenaed and deposed a nonparty witness and offered his dep-
osition in lieu of live testimony under CR 32.01(c), but failed
to do so, then it may not be possible to compel the witness's
personal attendance at trial."1" This rule theoretically provides
some measure of consideration for witnesses.
CR 30.02(6) provides a mechanism that is favorable to
both sides. If a party names, in his notice and subpoena, as a
deponent, a public or private corporation, a partnership, asso-
ciation, or government agency, the matters on which the ex-
amination is requested may be described with reasonable par-
ticularity.1 The burden of designating which person or
persons will testify then shifts to the deponent-entity, who
may also set forth the matters upon which each such designee
will testify.1 9 This provision should curb the abusive practice
of producing corporate officers and employees who disclaim
knowledge of facts that are available or known to some person
in the organization. 20 At the same time it provides the em-
ployer with some relief from the burden of an excessive num-
ber of pointless depositions. 2'
Deposition testimony may be recorded by other than
stenographic means, such as by tape recorder or videotape,
but only on motion and order. 22 Assuming that a party ob-
tains such an order, either party may nonetheless arrange for
the presence of a shorthand reporter. The author recommends
that a court reporter be present and transcribe all testimony
in the traditional way even though the proceedings are video-
taped. A stenographic transcript not only insures that the
"I See CR 30.07(2). CR 30.07(1) provides for the imposition of a similar sanction
when the party who has noticed a deposition fails to attend.
117 CR 45.05(2).
118 CR 30.02(6).
119 See id.
120 See, e.g., Haney v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 330 F.2d 940, 942-44 (4th Cir.
1964), for an example of this ploy.
121 However, CR 30.02(6) does nothing to preclude other types of discovery.
122 CR 30.02(4). See also FRCP 30, which provides that the parties may stipulate
in writing to non-stenographic means, and also provides for depositions by telephone.
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deposition will be saved in the case of mechanical failure, but
also provides a more convenient tool for briefing and present-
ing disputes to the court for rulings. 2 '
Two aspects of the actual taking of depositions deserve
some extended comment-stipulations and objections. The
parties may, by written stipulation, provide that the deposi-
tion be taken "before any person, at any time or place, upon
any notice, and in any manner."' 24 The parties may also mod-
ify the procedures provided in the discovery rules, except the
times provided for responses to discovery in CR 33.01, 34.02,
and 36.01, which may be extended only with the approval of
the court. 125 However, in connection with depositions, counsel
all too often enter into "the usual stipulations" without think-
ing about them. 26 The "usual stipulations" in Kentucky may
embrace a waiver of filing requirements and an agreement
that all objections except as to form shall be preserved until
trial. Waiver of filing seems unwise, because counsel may wish
to refer to a filed transcript in motions or at other stages in
the proceeding. The usual stipulation with respect to objec-
tions is unnecessary, inasmuch as it generally restates the law
contained in CR 32.04(a)-(b). In addition, legitimate substan-
tive objections should be interposed at the deposition if for no
other reason than to protect one's witness. 127
CR 30.05 in effect provides for an automatic waiver of sig-
nature, so a stipulation to that effect is also unnecessary.
Moreover, there may be no advantage to anyone in waiving
signature. A witness ordinarily ought to have the opportunity
to read and correct any errors in the transcript. By the same
token, the attorney who has taken the deposition has an inter-
est in cutting off belated claims of a witness that he was mis-
quoted. 28 If it is inconvenient for the witness to travel to the
123 See W. BARTHOLD, supra note 10, at 81-85; A. MORRILL, TRIAL DIPLOMACY §
15.7 (2d ed. 1972).
224 CR 29.
125 Id.
12 Blumenkopf, supra note 103, at 238-41.
12 W. BARTHOLD, supra note 10, at 87. On the other hand, there is a point at
which such "protection" may become obstruction. See Detective Comics v. Fawcett
Publications, 4 F.R.D. 237, 239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
22 Impeachment by prior inconsistent statements in a deposition is much more
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officer who took the deposition, the better practice would be
to obtain a stipulation at the outset that the deponent be per-
mitted to review, change, and sign the deposition before any
notary.129
It was stated earlier that "[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant ...
[or which] appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence." 130 Accordingly, the rules do not
authorize instructing witnesses not to answer,' 31 unless the
matter inquired into is privileged, is protected by the work
product doctrine, involves trade secrets, or is patently irrele-
vant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. 132 In this regard, a rule of reason will
probably be applied by any judge who is later called upon to
assess the conduct of counsel. 133
If the party opposing the questioning believes that the
proceeding is being conducted in bad faith or is being abused,
he may make a motion to terminate or limit the examina-
tion.' If the party conducting the deposition is faced with
improper and obstructive objections, or instructions not to an-
swer, he should have the stenographer's notes marked at the
appropriate point and either proceed with the balance of the
examination, or suspend it and move for a court order com-
pelling answers. 3 '
effective if the witness can be forced to admit that he read, corrected and signed the
deposition. See text accompanying notes 325-30 infra.
129 W. BARTHOLD, supra note 10, at 88; Blumenkopf, supra note 103, at 239.
120 CR 26.02(1) (emphasis added). For a discussion of this rule, see text accompa-
nying notes 11-23 supra.
131 CR 30.03(2).
132 See Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers, 657 F.2d 890, 902-03 (7th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers v. Plummer, 455
U.S. 1017 (1982); Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967, 973-74 (4th Cir.
1977).
1"I See Kamens v. Horizon Corp., 81 F.R.D. 444, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (ques-
tions about plaintiff's financial resources and participation in other class action litiga-
tion were not relevant to the issue at hand so her counsel's instruction not to answer
such questions was not improper).
134 CR 30.04.
"3 Kamens v. Horizon Corp., 81 F.R.D. at 445. A request that the reporter's
notes be marked immediately after an objection, instruction, or colloquy has been
interposed will assist the reporter in preparing a text to accompany such a motion.
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Objections to the form of questions are waived unless
made when the questions are asked.136 All other objections are
preserved, and may be asserted at trial, even though not inter-
posed at the deposition, unless the ground for objection might
have been obviated or removed if presented at that time. 3 '
Unfortunately, there is no unanimity on what objections are
"obviable" or "waivable" within the meaning of CR
32.04(3)(b). Prudent counsel will take care to lay all appropri-
ate evidentiary foundations in the deposition, on the assump-
tion that such objections may be raised for the first time at
trial.138
Just as CR 26.03 provides for protective orders prior to
the taking of a deposition, CR 30.04 provides for protection
after the examination has begun.39 Specifically, if a party or
the deponent can establish that the examination is being con-
ducted "in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to
annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party,' 40 the
objecting party may demand that the deposition be suspended
for the time necessary to move for an order of the court di-
recting that the examination cease or imposing limitations on
continued examination.' 4 ' This provision gives the court con-
siderable discretion to control the deposition to prevent abu-
sive tactics, 42 and specifically provides for an award of ex-
penses pursuant to CR 37.01(d). Generally, there must be a
clear showing of either bad faith or unreasonableness before
significant relief will be forthcoming, which suggests that
W. BARTHOLD, supra note 10, at 100.
136 CR 32.04(3)(b).
137 CR 32.04(3)(a).
" Blumenkopf, supra note 103, at 244. For the same reason all exhibits should
be handled, authenticated and made part of the record as if counsel were proceeding
at trial. W. BARTHOLD, supra note 10, at 90-92.
139 For a collection of cases concerning the construction and effect of the federal
rules and similar state rules relating to preventing, limiting or terminating the taking
of depositions, see Annot., supra note 35.
10 CR 30.04.
14 Id.
142 But cf. Armstrong v. Biggs, 302 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Ky. 1957) (because decision
on merits of similar action was imminent in federal court, state trial court abused its
discretion in overruling plaintiff's motion to defer deposition until after federal court
decision).
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counsel must carefully make a record of abuse to support a
motion for a protective order. 14 3 However, relief has been
granted where the witness has been subjected to repetitious
questioning, cumulative and unnecessary proceedings, or abu-
sive questioning. 44
The rules provide an alternative to oral examination by
providing for depositions of parties and nonparties upon writ-
ten questions (not to be confused with interrogatories). 145
Leave of court is usually not required. 46 Basically, questions
are served, with notice, to all parties, after commencement of
the action. Within thirty days of notice and service of the
written questions, "cross" questions may be served; within ten
days of such service, redirect questions may be served, and so
on. 147 The questions are answered by the witness before the
officer designated in the notice, and neither the parties nor
their agents or attorneys may be present. 148 This technique
may appear to be a good compromise between the expensive
but more flexible deposition on oral examination and inexpen-
sive but inflexible written interrogatories. However, the depo-
sition upon written questions is rarely used.
On occasion depositions may be taken before the filing of
an action, or pending an appeal. 49 The primary purpose of
such depositions is to preserve or perpetuate testimony that
may become unavailable with the passage of time. 50 Leave
'"' See DeWagenknecht v. Stinnes, 243 F.2d 413, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See text
accompanying notes 134-38 supra for a discussion of taking time to make a review-
able record.
"' See, e.g., Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers, at 895-904 (questions
were racially offensive, repetitious and irrelevant); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Al-
lied Chem. Alkalai Workers, 11 F.R.D. 518, 518-19 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (plaintiff had
already examined 23 witnesses, obtaining over 1,000 pages of information).
141 CR 31.01-.02.
146 However, "[t]he deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only
by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes." CR 31.01(1).
147 CR 31.01(3).
48 CR 31.02.
149 CR 27.01-.02.
150 See, e.g., Meredith v. Wilson, 423 S.W.2d 519 (Ky. 1968) (depositions taken
to preserve testimony when proceedings were suspended, pending outcome of appeal
in another case). See also Martin v. Reynolds Metal Corp., 297 F.2d 49, 55 (9th Cir.
1961) (pre-action discovery and inspection).
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must be obtained from the court in both instances. 5'
B. Suppression of Depositions
"All errors and irregularities in the notice for taking a
deposition are waived unless written objection is promptly
served upon the party giving the notice."'12 Likewise, a party
who has received no notice of the deposition may object to its
use against him, if the absence of notice deprived him of the
opportunity of appearing at the deposition and cross-examin-
ing the deponent.15s An exception to this rule may arise when
another party with identical interests and motive for cross-
examining appeared and participated at the deposition. 54
"Errors and irregularities" regarding the way in which a depo-
sition is transcribed, "prepared, certified, sealed, indorsed,
transmitted, filed or otherwise dealt with. . under Rules 30
and 31 are waived unless a motion to suppress . . . is made
with reasonable promptness after such defect is, or with due
diligence might have been, ascertained.' 55 Objections to the
proponent's failure to file, 55 or give notice of the filing of the
151 CR 27.01(1) (before action-obtain leave of court by verified petition); CR
27.02 (pending appeal-obtain leave of court by motion).
CR 27, which mirrors FRCP 27, does not specifically authorize discovery as an
aid to finding a lawsuit and framing a complaint. Such an action has been held to be
improper use of the Federal Rule. See In re Boland, 26 F.R. Serv.2d (Callaghan) 598
(D.D.C. 1978) (FRCP 27(a) is not a method of determining whether and against
whom a cause of action exists).
152 CR 32.04(1).
153 See CR 32.07. Might it be argued that "day in the life" films are analogous to
deposition, and ought to be admitted only after a showing that the opponent was
given notice and an opportunity to monitor the making of the film? Cf. Balian v.
General Motors, 296 A.2d 317, 323-24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972) (defendant
prepared a film of an experiment and presented the film at trial. Plaintiff had no
prior knowledge of the experiment or the film prior to trial. The court held that fun-
damental fairness required that plaintiff should have received notice and opportunity
to monitor the experiment and the making of the film.) But see, Grimes v. Employers
Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Ala. 1977) ("Day in the life" film
admitted under F.R. Ev. 803(24)).
11 Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197, 205 (7th Cir. 1970).
155 CR 32.04(4).
156 If the deposition has not been filed, counsel may argue that the opposing
counsel knows the content of the deposition or has a copy, and cannot claim
prejudice. C. HOLLEY, TRIAL OF A Cirn LAWSUIT (NUTS AND BOLTS) § 4.13 (1978). The
court has some discretion with respect to admitting unfiled depositions. Cf. Gish v.
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deposition, may also be waived.'57
Any party may make a written request before the officer
taking the deposition that the transcribed testimony be sub-
mitted to the witness for examination and signature.1 58 How-
ever, a deposition need not be signed absent a written request,
and unsigned depositions may therefore be used for any pur-
pose. 159 If a request for signature has been made, a party may
object to the admission of the unsigned deposition, but such
objection must be advanced by way of a timely motion to sup-
press. 160 In addition, death, illness or other excuses may jus-
tify use of an unsigned deposition if the testimony is relevant
and important and no substantial showing of prejudice can be
demonstrated.' 6 '
In complying with a request to sign, the deponent will
read the transcript and may request the officer to note
changes to his testimony and his reasons for such changes; the
deponent will then sign the deposition.162 In making changes
to the transcript, the deponent may not cause the original tes-
timony to be obliterated or rendered unreadable because both
versions are admissible. 6 3 Moreover, if further cross-examina-
tion is necessitated by the changes, it would seem logical that
the opponent may reopen the deposition,6 or move to sup-
Hale, 283 S.W.2d at 204 (deposition not filed within time set by court due to illness of
notary and in absence of motion for continuance, trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion by admitting deposition).
157 See Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181, 188 (D. Md. 1962)
(failure to notify plaintiff of filing of depositions was harmless because plaintiff's
counsel saw depositions prior to trial.)
158 CR 30.05.
159 Id. If the deposition is not signed, the officer shall sign it and state the fact of
the illness or absence of the witness or the refusal to sign together with the reason
given. CR 30.05. The deposition may then be used unless, on a motion to suppress,
the court holds that the reason for refusal requires rejection of the deposition. Id.
160 Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972); Bern-
stein v. Brenner, 51 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 1970). See also Gish v. Hale, 283 S.W.2d 202
(objection not raised until appeal deemed waived because not timely made).
161 Bernstein v. Brenner, 51 F.R.D. at 11-13. See also CR 30.05.
182 CR 30.05.
163 Allen & Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337, 340 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
,6, Colin v. Thompson, 16 F.R.D. 194 (W.D. Mo. 1954); DeSeversky v. Republic
Aviation Corp., 2 F.R.D. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). Reporting costs may be ordered paid
by deponent whose changes necessitated the additional session. Cf. 16 F.R.D. at 195.
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press it.' 65
It has been suggested in many cases that the opposing
party may suppress a deposition if the witness dies or be-
comes incapacitated before his direct testimony has been
tested by cross-examination. 166 However, the modern view
seems to be that, in civil cases, "the half-loaf of direct testi-
mony is better than no bread at all."'61 7 Accordingly, such dep-
osition testimony has been admitted in a number of cases."68
In addition, the opponent's consent to an adjournment or sus-
pension of the deposition prior to cross-examination may con-
stitute a waiver in the event that the witness subsequently be-
comes disabled from testifying.6 9 That a party or witness
reviewed and rehearsed the deposition questions and answers
with counsel is, of course, no ground for suppression. 7 0
III. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES
Any party may serve written interrogatories on any other
party; there is no restriction to "adverse" parties.' 71 "Interrog-
atories may. . . be served upon the plaintiff after commence-
ment of the action and upon any other party with or after
service of the summons upon that party.' 172 If interrogatories
are served upon a corporation, partnership, association, or
governmental agency they must be answered by an officer or
an agent of such entity.'"7
161 But see Allen & Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. at 340-41 (mo-
tion to suppress witness's changes or to conduct further cross-examination denied
because changes were not in direct contradiction of vital point).
166 See, e.g., Continental Can Co. v. Crow Cork & Seal, Inc., 39 F.R.D. 354, 356
(E.D. Pa. 1965). But if the party who moves for suppression consented to a postpone-
ment of questioning there will be no suppression. Id.
'7 See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 19, at 45 (2d ed.
1972).
"0 See, e.g., Derewecki v. Pennsylvania R.R., 353 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1965); Inland
Bonding Co. v. Mainland Nat'l Bank, 3 F.R.D. 438 (D.N.J. 1944).
166 Continental Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal, Inc., 39 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. Pa.
1965).
170 Hamdi & Ibrahim Mango Co. v. Fire Ass'n, 20 F.R.D. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
171 CR 33.01. Cf. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 115 (1964) (rejecting a
contention that examinations under FRCP 35 could be had only against an opposing
party).
172 CR 33.01(1).
173 Id. The entity selects the particular officer or agent who will respond to the
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Interrogatories may relate to any matter within the scope
of CR 26.02, and answers to interrogatories may be used to
the extent permitted by the rules of evidence. 17 4 In addition,
interrogatories may request opinions or contentions calling for
the application of law to fact,175 which should greatly increase
the utility of interrogatories in narrowing the issues for trial.
Each interrogatory served on a party must be answered or
objected to within thirty days, while a defendant has forty-
five days after service of the summons and complaint upon
him to serve his answers or objections. 6 Objections must be
specific; broad or general objections to groups of interrogato-
ries are improper. 7 7 Misleading and evasive answers "justify
the court's viewing with suspicion the contentions of the party
so answering,"' 8 and answers such as "N/A" or "Don't recall"
may lead to the imposition of sanctions. 7 9 In addition un-
signed or unsworn answers may be rejected by the court. 80
The prudent lawyer will attempt to answer interrogato-
ries as fairly and completely as he or she can, and interpose
timely and specific objections, rather than waiting for oppos-
ing counsel to institute enforcement proceedings. The Ken-
tucky courts have held that pleadings may be stricken, or
judgment entered, where a party fails to respond to interroga-
tories without seeking a protective order."8 '
A party asked to respond to interrogatories has some op-
tions. He may answer on information and belief and state the
interrogatories. Holland v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 28 F.R.D. 595
(D.D.C. 1961).
174 CR 33.02. Answers to interrogatories are not admissible on behalf of the an-
swering party. Haskell Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Weeks, 237 F.2d 263, 267 (9th Cir.
1956). However, they may constitute admissions of a party opponent or declarations
against interest, and may also be used for impeachment. See text accompanying notes
331-35 infra.
175 CR 33.02(2). See Diversified Prods. Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.R.D. 3, 3-
5 (D. Md. 1967).
178 CR 33.01(2).
177 Wurlitzer Co. v. United States EEOC, 50 F.R.D. 421, 424 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
18 See Ruiz v. Hamburg-American Line, 478 F.2d 29, 33 (9th Cir. 1973).
178 Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
50 F.R.D. 13, 18-28 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
'80 See Cabales v. United States, 51 F.R.D. 498, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
181 See Benjamin v. Near E. Rug Co., 535 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1976); Naive v. Jones,
353 S.W.2d 365, 366 (Ky. 1961).
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information upon which the answer is based.182 He may also
deny any knowledge concerning a particular interrogatory, if
he states the efforts made to acquire the knowledge. 8 3 Fi-
nally, a party also has the option to produce business records
in lieu of answers.18 4 Courts, however, must take care to insure
that this device is not abused by parties who would dump a
large number of documents on an opponent to avoid answer-
ing. In addition, this rule should not be relied on as a matter
of course, since production of records may give an opponent
more information than answers to the interrogatories.'85
Interrogatories are an excellent means of discovering the
existence of documents and the identity of witnesses known to
the answering party at the time the answers are served.'
However, the use of burdensome "form" interrogatories and
irrelevant interrogatories has led to a number of reform pro-
posals limiting the number that may be served in a given
case. 8 7 Kentucky now has a limit on the number of interroga-
tories which may be served without leave of court. 8 It re-
182 Tinker & Rasor v. Pipeline Inspection Co., 16 F.R.D. 465, 467 (W.D. Mo.
1954).
183 Breeland v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 179 F. Supp. 464, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). If
the answering party is a corporation or other entity, it must submit all information
available to the entity and its agents and employees. See Wycoff v. Nichols, 32 F.R.D.
370 (W.D. Mo. 1963). The current rule appears to require that a reasonable burden
be imposed on the answering party to secure information that is readily available to
him in answering interrogatories.
184 CR 33.03.
185 The responding party should always carefully screen documents produced
under CR 34 or CR 33.03. See Ranney-Brown Distribs., Inc. v. E.T. Barwick Indus.,
75 F.R.D. 3, 5-6 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
186 Cf. Thompson v. Mills, 432 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1968) (failure to include name of.
eye witness who would have given testimony adverse to that of witness called by the
answering party led to grant of a new trial). But compare Fernandez v. United Fruit
Co., 50 F.R.D. 82 (D. Md. 1970) (concerning "work product").
197 See, e.g., CR 33.01(3), 93.02. See also In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 74
F.R.D. 497 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Fishman v. A.H. Riise Gift Shop, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 704
(D.V.I. 1975) (protective order directing use of deposition rather than interrogato-
ries); Frost v. Williams, 46 F.R.D. 484 (D. Md. 1969) ("formbook" interrogatories op-
pressive and frivolous); Barouh Eaton Allen Corp. v. International Business Machs.
Corp., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,255 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). Cumbersome defini-
tions may also make interrogatories unduly burdensome. See Diversified Prods. Corp.
v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.R.D. 3 (D. Md. 1967).
188 CR 33.01(3) reads:
(3) Each party may propound to a maximum of thirty (30) interrogatories
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mains to be seen whether such an artificial limitation will
prove to be "workable."' 189 Counsel should keep these concerns
in mind when employing interrogatories, and insure that all
questions are concise and pertinent to the subject matter of
the litigation.190
IV. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS-ENTRY UPON
LAND FOR INSPECTION
The Civil Rules provide for the discovery of documents,
tangible things, and other real evidence.19' The 1971 amend-
ments to the Civil Rules eliminated the requirement of "good
cause" and brought Kentucky practice into conformity with
federal procedure, so that this discovery device might operate
extrajudicially. Basically, the rules now provide for discovery
from a party upon service of a request to produce.192 These
particular discovery rules do not govern discovery from non-
parties, 193 but discovery of documents and things from a non-
party can be had by way of a subpoena duces tecum.19 4 While
and thirty requests for admission to each other party; for purposes of this
Rule, each subpart of an interrogatory or request shall be counted as a sep-
arate interrogatory or request. The following shall not be included in the
maximum allowed: interrogatories requesting (a) the name and address of
the person answering; (b) the names and addresses of the witnesses; and (c)
whether the person answering is willing to supplement his answers if infor-
mation subsequently becomes available. Any party may move the Court for
permission to propound either interrogatories or requests for admission in
excess of the limit of thirty (30).
189 See D. SEGAL, SURVEY OP THE LITERATURE ON DISCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE
PRESENT: EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTIONS AND PROPOSED REFORMS 50 (1978). See also
Bogorad, The Impact of the Amended Rules Upon Discovery Practice Before the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 66 TRADE-MARK REP. 28, 38 (1976) (limitation
abolished due to influx of motions for additional interrogatories).
19" For assistance in the preparation of interrogatories see D. DANNER, PATTERN
INTERROGATORIES (1970). This five-volume set should be used for guidance, and not as
a substitute for independent thought.
191 CR 34.01-.03.
192 CR 34.01.
193 See Thomas v. Nuss, 353 F.2d 257 (6th Cir. 1965) (rule does not run to non-
party witnesses). Cf. Wilson v. Davis, 21 F.R.D. 217 (W.D. Mich. 1957) (insurer in
control of litigation considered to be actual party to litigation). See generally
Haydock & Herr, Production of Results Under Rule 34, 5 Am. J. TRIAL ADVoc. 253,
273-76 (1981).
9 CR 30.02(1), 45.04(1).
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CR 34.03 suggests that an independent action may be brought
against a nonparty for permission to enter land, or for other
discovery, one is hard pressed to find any English or American
authority for such discovery in the absence of a statute or
rule, 195 and it is doubtful that an implied right can be derived
from the Civil Rule.1 96
The Civil Rule now "authorizes the broadest sweep of ac-
cess, inspection, examination, testing, copying, and
photographing of documents or objects in the possession or
control of another party" 97 so long as the materials requested
are within the scope of CR 26.02(2).198 If care has been taken
to demand categories of documents or things that indicate on
their face some relationship to at least one issue raised in the
pleadings, 199 and counsel has not demanded "too much," the
"relevancy" requirement of the Civil Rules will be met.
Assuming that counsel has in mind the discovery of rele-
vant and useful documents and things, he must determine if
those items are in the "possession, custody, or control of an
adverse party." 00 "Control" has been construed broadly. For
example, a party may be required to produce documents and
things in the possession of the party's attorney2 1 (absent a
legitimate objection on grounds of work product or privilege);
an expert expected to be called at trial;2 0 2 liability insurer;203
' See J. LEviNE supra note 67, at 105; Welling, Discovery of Non-Parties' Tan-
gible Things Under The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
110 (1983).
'" See Home Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 89 F.R.D. 485, 487 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
19 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2206, at 607
(1970).
I' CR 34.01.
199 W. BARTHOLD, supra note 10, at 171. See Blatt v. Casa Blanca Cigar Co., 51
F.R.D. 312 (M.D. Pa. 1970). This is only a point of departure, howevdr, since the Civil
Rules require only relevancy to the "subject matter" of the action. See In re Folding
Carton Antitrust Litig., 76 F.R.D. 420, 423 (N.D. IlM. 1977).
200 CR 34.01. Some cases have stressed that a "mere" witness should not be bur-
dened with a subpoena demanding the production of documents which are also avail-
able from a party. See, e.g., Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 32 F.R.D. 208
(E.D. Tenn. 1963).
201 In re Ruppert, 309 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1962).
202 Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 74 F.R.D. 594 (D. Conn. 1977). Cf. Vicars
v. Beaver Creek Mining Co., 387 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1965) (Rules of Procedure of Work-
ers Compensation Board allow production by expert upon showing of good cause).
202 Bingle v. Liggett Drug Co., 11 F.R.D. 593 (D. Mass. 1951).
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sister corporation;20 4 physician;205 or other nonparty, if the
party has a legal right to obtain the documents.20 8
The procedure for obtaining documents is as follows:
"The request may. . . be served upon the plaintiff after com-
mencement of the action and upon any other party with or
after service of the summons upon that party."20 7 The most
common procedure is for a party to employ interrogatories to
locate and identify discoverable matter, followed by CR 34.02
requests for production.208 It is also possible for counsel to in-
clude a request for production in the notice of deposition sent
to a party.209 Some courts have also permitted counsel to com-
bine Rule 34 requests in the same document with Rule 33
interrogatories.210
A request for production must set forth what is sought
with "reasonable particularity, ' 211 a flexible standard212 which
will be met if the judge can say that a reasonable person
would know what was desired. 213 The items sought may be
designated by individual item or by category.2 4 The request
must also "specify a reasonable time, place, and manner of
204 Advance Labor Serv., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 60 F.R.D. 632
(N.D. Ill. 1973).
20I Schwartz v. Travelers Ins. Co., 17 F.R.D. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
201 See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 76 F.R.D. at 420 (holding that a
"right" to withhold benefits still being received by former employees is an indicia of
"control"). It has also been held that a party has control over income tax returns
available from the Internal Revenue Service. Tollefson v. Phillips, 16 F.R.D. 348 (D.
Mass. 1954); Reeves v. Pennsylvania R.R., 80 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D. Del. 1948). How-
ever, the request for production must be timely. Hedges v. Neace, 307 S.W.2d 564,
567-68 (Ky. 1957). As to bank account records, see Paramount Film Distrib. Co. v.
Ram, 91 F. Supp. 778 (E.D.S.C. 1950).
207 CR 34.02(1).
20I See W. BARTHOLD, supra note 10, at 55-57.
209 CR 30.02(5).
211 Compare Haydock & Herr, supra note 193, at 260-61 and 4 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE at 1 33.22, with F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 194 (1965) (noting "fairly
uniform judicial disapproval" of this technique) and C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 580 (4th ed. 1983). For an example of this technique see S. SPEISER, LAwsUrr
178-79 (1980).
211 CR 34.02(1).
212 Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 58 F.R.D. 348, 353
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
213 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 197, at § 2211.
214 CR 34.02(1). For useful drafting techniques see W. BARTHOLD, supra note 10,
at 165-76; HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 193, at 253.
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making the inspection" and copying, 15 which will ordinarily
be the place where the documents are located.21 e
The party served with a request must serve a written re-
sponse within thirty days after service of the request, al-
though a defendant may serve a response within forty-five
days after service of the summons upon that defendant. 17
The response must state that the inspection will be permitted
as requested, or state an objection specifying both the ques-
tionable item or category and the reasons for the objection. s
If an objection is interposed, or if there is no response, or if
inspection is otherwise impeded, the party seeking production
may move the court for an order to compel pursuant to CR
37.01.219 The granting of such a motion is discretionary.220
CR 34.01 was amended in 1971 to allow discovery of
"data compilations from which information can be obtained,
translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection
devices," which suggests that the court may require the pro-
duction of a data bank, or require production of input data
for computers, in appropriate cases.2 21 The new rule also
states that such data must be delivered in a "reasonably use-
ful form," meaning that an opponent may not circumvent a
production order by adopting business methods or indexing
systems which hide relevant information and defeat
215 CR 34.02(1).
211 See Petruska v. Johns-Manville, 83 F.R.D. 32, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
217 CR 34.02(2). "The court may allow a shorter or longer time." Id.
213 Id. A useful checklist of 14 common objections, with supporting authorities,
may be found in Haydock & Herr, supra note 193, at 265-67. For an interesting opin-
ion dealing with waiver of privileges by inadvertent production, see Ranney-Brown
Distribs. Inc. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
21, CR 34.02(2).
220 But see Perkins v. Trailco Mfg. & Sales Co., 613 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1981) (since
plaintiff produced circumstantial evidence to show that accident could have been
caused by a defective trailer, it was error to deny a motion compelling manufacturer
to produce certain specified documents for copying).
Failures to produce often result in preclusion orders. Admiral Theatre Corp. v.
Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 897-98 (8th Cir. 1978). Failures to produce may
also justify dismissal or default judgment. See CR 37.02(2)(c).
221 See Pope, Rule 34: Controlling the Paper Avalanche, 7 LITIGATION, Spring
1981, at 28-29 (citing Bell v. Automobile Club, 80 F.R.D. 228 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Ad-
ams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 220 (W.D. Va. 1972)).
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discovery.222
CR 34.01 also provides for the sampling and testing of
tangible things discoverable under CR 26.02. If the particular
testing sought might result in the destruction of an item, pru-
dent counsel will only proceed pursuant to a court order, with
notice to all parties and other safeguards, to insure that any
evidence gained thereby will be admissible at trial.223
V. PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATIONS
The procedures governing physical and mental examina-
tions in Kentucky are contained in CR 35.01 and CR 35.02.
These rules are similar to FRCP 35, although the absence of a
statutory physician-patient privilege in Kentucky2 24 makes
the waiver provision of FRCP 35(b)(2) unnecessary. CR 35.01
provides for a physical or mental examination, or examina-
tions,225 "only on motion and for good cause shown. '226 The
examinee must be a party, or "a person in the custody or
under the legal control of a party," whose physical or mental
condition is "in controversy. '227 The words, "in controversy"
have broader meaning than the words "in issue,''22 e but the
scope of discovery allowed by CR 35.01 is much narrower than
222 Kozlowski v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Mass. 1976). For an
excellent discussion of computers and discovery see Note, Computer Discovery In
Federal Litigation: Playing By The Rules, 69 GEo. L.J. 1465 (1980-81).
FRCP 34(b) has also been amended to require production "as [the records] are
kept in the usual course of business" or in an organized fashion corresponding to the
categories of the request. This eliminates the abusive practice of "shuffling." Com-
pare Underwood, supra note 50, at 657-58, n.156.
223 An excellent collection of state authorities on the subject of destructive test-
ing can be found in Haydock & Herr, supra note 193, at 269-72.
224 R. LAWSON, KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK § 5.15 (1976). Many attor-
neys do not know that the federal courts do not recognize a physician-patient privi-
lege in federal question cases, although they will apply any state privileges in a diver-
sity case. See Sutton v. National Distillers Prods. Co., 445 F. Supp. 1319, 1376 (S.D.
Ohio 1978), aff'd, 628 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1980).
225 In some situations it may be necessary for the party to undergo multiple ex-
aminations. See Vopelak v. Williams, 42 F.R.D. 387 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (change in con-
dition after a prior examination); Marshall v. Peters, 31 F.R.D. 238 (S.D. Ohio 1962)
(need for examinations by different specialists).
226 CR 35.01.
227 Id.
228 See Turner v. Town of Amherst, 308 N.Y.S.2d 547, 551-52 (N.Y. App. Div.
1970).
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that allowed generally in CR 26.02.29 The author would rec-
ommend that counsel try to be present with his client when
an examining physician takes the patient's history, and note
the time taken to perform any tests and the type of tests
administered.2 30
CR 35.02 contains the same rules regarding access to re-
ports of examination as FRCP 35(b). Specifically, the party
examined may request and obtain the reports of the examina-
tion, and of all earlier examinations of the same condition.
However, by making this request, counsel gives the examining
party an equal right to any reports of prior and subsequent
examinations for the same condition.231 If counsel for the ex-
aminee has prior harmful reports that have not been discov-
ered by the party requesting and conducting the examination,
good strategy may dictate that he not request a report from
the examining physician.282 CR 35.02 applies to examinations
made by agreement of the parties, as well as to those made
under court order, unless the agreement expressly provides
otherwise.23 3
Any time counsel deals with a physician he should refresh
his recollection as to the applicability of the Interprofessional
Code for Physicians and Attorneys. This Code provides guide-
lines for "professional courtesy" relating to discovery from
physicians.2 84
2' Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 117 (1964).
231 Cf. Warrick v. Brode, 46 F.R.D. 427 (D. Del. 1969) (the court may allow a
party's personal physician to be present during the examination, although counsel
may be excluded); Dziwanoski v. Ocean Carriers Corp., 26 F.R.D. 595 (D.C. Md.
1960); Whanger v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 207 N.W.2d 74 (Wis. 1973) (spe-
cial circumstances such as hostility, reluctance or fear may create a situation where
attendance of counsel at the examination may expedite the process).
231 CR 35.02. It should be noted that the party requiring an examination cannot
shield the examining physician's report by requesting only an oral report. Salvatore v.
American Cyanamid Co., 94 F.R.D. 156 (D.R.L 1982).
2 G. VETTER, supra note 13, at 191.
I" CR 35.02(2).
231 See NATIONAL INTERPROFESSIONAL CODE FOR PHYSICIANs & ATTORNEYS (1975).
See also INTERPROFESSIONAL CODE (Fayette County Medical Society and Fayette
County Bar Association) (governing discovery, court appearances, medical reports,
subpoenas and compensation).
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VI. REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
Requests to admit are not, strictly speaking, discovery de-
vices. Their real purpose is to obtain admissions that will re-
move issues from the litigation." 5 As one court put it, their
purpose is to "circumscribe contested factual issues in a case,
either basic or ultimate facts" and not "to make discovery of
the existence of facts, as such," although they may inciden-
tally result in some discovery.2 36 The Kentucky Rules and
Federal Rules are virtually identical.
Requests to admit may run only from one party to an-
other party,31 and may not be served on nonparty wit-
nesses.238 These requests must be written,23 and each one
should be limited to a single matter so as to preclude an eva-
sive response.2 40 The request should permit (and require) a
"yes" or "no" answer,2 1 because any verbose, lengthy, or com-
pound request may be stricken.242 Formerly, there was no
limit on the number of requests or sets of requests243 that
could be submitted, although excessive or burdensome re-
quests could give rise to a valid objection in a proper case.
However, the Rules have now been amended to limit the num-
ber of requests to thirty.244
Generally, a party may serve a request on any other party
at any time after the action is commenced; a defendant must
235 Ironically, the request to admit is hardly ever used. See J. LzvmE, supra note
67, at 51.
236 Jones v. Boyd Truck Lines, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 67, 69 (W.D. Mo. 1951). See also
McGiboney v. Board of Ed., 387 S.W.2d 869, 875 (1965).
237 See CR 36.01.
218 See id. They may be served on a guardian ad litem. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Carr, 169 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1959).
239 CR 36.01.
240 Many tips for drafting requests and responses thereto may be found in W,
BARTHOLD, supra note 10, at 234-44; G. VE=R, supra note 13, at 151-59.
241 Johnstone v. Cronlund, 25 F.R.D. 42 (E.D. Pa. 1960). If the request demands
an admission as to the genuineness of a document, the request should not character-
ize its contents nor ask for an interpretation. See, e.g., Jackson Buff Corp. v. Mar-
celle, 20 F.R.D. 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
242 Baldwin v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 15 F.R.D. 84 (D. Neb.
1953).
243 See United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.,
25 F.R.D. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
244 See CR 33.01(3).
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first be served with process, but the admission request may
accompany the process.245 A party has thirty days to respond
unless the court has ordered a longer or shorter time, but a
defendant is given forty-five days after service of the sum-
mons upon him.246 Either an answer or objection must be filed
within the time specified by the Rules, and failure to do so is
automatically deemed an admission.247 Because court enforce-
ment may be sought if a party seeks to avoid admission by
frivolous or inadequate answers or denials,24 s counsel must
take care in responding to these requests.
A request to admit may be made as to any matters within
the scope of CR 26.02 "that relate to statements or opinions
of fact or of the application of law to fact. 2 49 Clearly then, a
request is not objectionable merely because it seeks admission
of such information. 50 Moreover, a request may run to dis-
puted and crucial facts. 5 1 Since CR 36.01(2) provides that a
party may not object solely on the ground that the matter re-
ferred to presents a genuine issue for trial, he should be re-
quired to answer or concede the matter. 5 2 Additionally, a
party may not simply respond that he is unable to admit or
deny, nor may he state that he does not know the answer, if
such information is within his knowledge or he could inform
M, See CR 36.01(1).
246 CR 36.01(2).
247 CR 36.01(2). See Commonwealth ex rel. Matthews v. Rice, 415 S.W.2d 618,
619 (Ky. 1966); Commonwealth v. Compton, 387 S.W.2d 314, 315 (Ky. 1965); Smather
v. May, 379 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Ky. 1964); Rose v. Rawlins, 358 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Ky.
1962); Lyons v. Sponcil, 343 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Ky. 1961). See also Sims v. Motor
Transp. Lines v. Foster, 293 S.W.2d 226, 228-29 (Ky. 1956) (trial court properly re-
fused to allow belated answers). But see United States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045
(D. Del. 1973) (court may relieve party of consequences for failure to admit).
248 CR 36.01(3).
24 CR 36.01(1). As to relevance, see Rogers v. Winchester Bldg. & Say. !ssoc.,
293 S.W.2d 463 (Ky. 1956).
250 For the difficulty of determining the meaning of "admissible fact" under the
rule before this clarifying language was added, see Lyons v. Sponcil, 343 S.W.2d 836
(Ky. 1961).
251 See McGonigle v. Baxter, 27 F.R.D. 504 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (requested admission
not objectionable on ground that it sought admission of disputed issue of fact);
United States v. Ehbauer, 13 F.R.D. 462 (W.D. Mo. 1952) (not valid objection that
request was for admission of controversial fact). But cf. Lyons v. Sponcil, 343 S.W.2d
at 836 (expressing some uncertainty on this point).
15 See FRCP 36 advisory committee notes to 1970 amendment.
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himself with reasonable effort.25
The party requesting admissions may move to determine
the sufficiency of answers and objections.254 Accordingly, al-
though requests to admit are not self-enforcing, a party may
obtain an early resolution of the issues raised by his requests.
The court may make appropriate determinations on motion,
or defer decision until the pre-trial conference or a designated
time prior to trial.255 If the court finds that the opponent has
provided frivolous or evasive answers, it has several options. It
may strike the answers or deem them admissions, order new
answers, or order the answers to be taken as denials, 56 thus
subjecting the party to potential sanctions under CR 37.03.25
Admissions, failures to respond and evasive answers that
are deemed admissions may be used as the basis for summary
judgment or dispositive motions at trial.258 By the better view,
an item actually admitted is conclusively established in the
pending action, and the admission is not subject to contradic-
tion-2 59 unless the court permits withdrawal or amendment of
25 CR 36.01(2). See Hise v. Lockwood Grader Corp., 153 F. Supp. 276, 278 (D.
Neb. 1957); E.H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enters. Inc., 16 F.R.D. 571, 574-75 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
For a collection of cases dealing with the sufficiency of responses to requests for ad-
missions see Annot., 8 A.L.R. 4TH 728 (1981).
254 CR 36.01(3).
255 Id.
256 See id. Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 15 F.R.D. 339, 340
(E.D.N.Y. 1954). See also Princess Pat, Ltd. v. National Carloading Corp., 223 F.2d
916, 920 (7th Cir. 1955); United States v. Jefferson Trust & Sav. Bank, 31 F.R.D. 137,
140-42 (S.D. Ill. 1962). For cases where denials were not specific, or where claims of
inability to admit or deny were not specific, see Southern Ry. v. Crosby, 201 F.2d 878,
880 (4th Cir. 1953); Woods v. Stewart, 171 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1948); SEC v. Kaye,
Real & Co., 122 F. Supp. 639, 640-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Sieb's Hatcheries, Inc. v. Lind-
ley, 13 F.R.D. 113, 118-19 (W.D. Ark. 1952); United States v. Laney, 96 F. Supp. 482,
483-84 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
I, See CR 36.01(3). Theoretically, substantial sanctions are available for a
wrongful denial of a request to admit. CR 37.03 provides that the court shall order
the party who made a wrongful denial to pay the reasonable expenses and attorney
fees incurred in proving the denied matter, unless the matter was unimportant or
subject to denial in good faith. However, experience suggests that the party request-
ing an award of costs will find that this sanctioning mechanism is impractical if only a
general verdict has been returned. See J. LEvNE, supra note 67, at 51 (suggesting
that the requesting party will ordinarily fail to obtain costs in the absence of a special
verdict or interrogatories as to specific facts and documents).
258 See Commonwealth ex rel. Matthews v. Rice, 415 S.W.2d at 619-20.
215 See McSparran v. Hanigan, 225 F. Supp. 628, 636-38 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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the answer.6 0 In jury trials, requests must be formally offered
into evidence to be considered; in non-jury cases no formal
admission is required if the parties know the court is going to
consider the requests and answers, and they have an opportu-
nity to object.26'
VII. SUPPLEMENTATION OF RESPONSES
CR 26.05, which is identical to FRCP 26(e), provides that
there is no duty to supplemental responses to discovery with
after-acquired information, except in certain limited situa-
tiofs.2 6 2 Because the rule now addresses the problem of sup-
plementation with specific exceptions to a "no duty rule, "2 13 a
party should not be able to expand the duty merely by mak-
ing a unilateral demand for supplemental responses in a pre-
amble to his discovery request. 64
CR 26.05(a)(i)-(ii) list the most common instances in
which supplementation is appropriate as a matter of course:
where a request calls for the identity and location of persons
260 CR 36.02. See Moosman v. Joseph P. Blitz, Inc., 358 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir.
1966).
261 Mid-Southern Toyota, Ltd. v. Bug's Imports, Inc., 453 S.W.2d 544, 550 (Ky.
1970).
262 CR 26.05 states:
(a) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with
respect to any question directly addressed to (i) the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (ii) the identity of
each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject
matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his
testimony.
(b) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he
obtains information upon the basis of which (i) he knows that the response
was incorrect when made, or (ii) he knows that the response though correct
when made is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure
to amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment.
(c) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the court,
agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new requests
for supplementation of prior responses.
Counsel should note that CR 93.04(2) has changed the limited duty rule to an across-
the-board requirement of supplementation of all prior responses for those circuits
using the Special Rules.
263 CR 26.05.
264 See Fernandes v. United Fruit Co., 50 F.R.D. 82, 84 (D. Md. 1970); Diversi-
fied Prods. Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.R.D. 3 (D. Md. 1967).
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having knowledge of discoverable matter, or where a request
seeks information concerning expert trial witnesses. In con-
nection with experts, the rule requires supplementary re-
sponses or discovery, where a witness changes his opinion af-
ter being deposed.26 5 In other words, the rule is not, by its
terms, limited to responses to interrogatories. 6
CR 26.05(b) has been held to require, or permit, supple-
mentation only when nondisclosure would amount to knowing
concealment.267 The duty to supplement responses may be ex-
panded by court order or agreement, and a party may make
new requests for supplementation prior to trial.268 Pre-trial is
an appropriate time to routinely seek supplementation. 269
The trial court has inherent power to enforce the provi-
sions of the rule by preclusion orders or other sanctions.
Whether or not such sanctions should be imposed rests in the
discretion of the court.270 Among the factors to be considered
are: any explanation for the failure to supplement a prior re-
sponse; the importance of the evidence or testimony that
might otherwise be excluded; the time needed to respond to
the surprise evidence (including the possibility of a continu-
ance); and the degree of prejudice to the party entitled to the
supplemental response that was not forthcoming.2 7 1
VIII. FAILURE To MAKE DISCOVERY-SANCTIONS
Much of the recent attention given to "discovery abuse"
has focused on unjustified resistance to legitimate discovery
requests,272 as opposed to the problem created by "too much"
discovery. CR 37.01 through CR 37.06 now provide an array
265 See CR 26.05(a)(i).
266 Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 96-97 (8th Cir. 1977).
2617 Havenfield Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 509 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 999 (1975).
268 CR 26.05(c).
266 G. VETMER, supra note 13, at 267.
270 See Phil Crowley Steel Corp. v. Macomber, Inc., 601 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979).
271 See Murphy v. Magnolia Elec. Power Ass'n, 639 F.2d 232, 234-35 (5th Cir.
1981).
272 For a collection of authorities, see Underwood, supra note 50, at 625.
273 But see Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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of sanctions to be imposed on "stone-walling" parties. Ironi-
cally, statistical evidence collected in other jurisdictions with
similar rules suggest that judges have been reluctant to im-
pose sanctions,274 and attorneys have been reluctant to invoke
them.27 5
Courts and commentators have increasingly come to view
the imposition of severe sanctions as a necessary means of de-
terring "other parties to other lawsuits" from resisting discov-
ery on insubstantial grounds . 6 Following the amendments of
the Federal Rules, the Kentucky Civil Rules were amended to
eliminate language suggesting that a finding of "wilfulness"
must precede the imposition of severe sanctions. 7 7 Accord-
ingly, it is appropriate to catalog the available sanctions and
generally review instances in which severe sanctions may be
appropriate.
In practice, the party seeking to compel discovery and in-
voke sanctions against his opponent will usually proceed in
two steps: he will move for an order compelling discovery that
has been refused, and then move for sanctions based on diso-
bedience of the order. 7  Such a motion compelling discovery
is appropriate if:
(1) a deponent fails to answer a question submitted or
propounded in a deposition on oral examination, or on written
questions;
(2) "a corporation or other entity fails to make a designa-
tion under Rule 30.02(6) or 31.101(2)"; or
274 See Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 787; Rosenberg, Discovery
Abuse, 7 LITIGATION, Spring 1981, at 8-9.
275 p. CONNOLLEY, E. HOLLERMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE
CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978); D. SEGAL, SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON
DISCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE PRESENT: EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTIONS AND PROPOSED
REFORMS (1978).
278 See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1980); National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976); Note,
The Emerging Deterrance Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1977-78).
2177 For decisions under the prior rule see Armstrong v. Biggs, 275 S.W.2d 60 (Ky.
1955) (old rule 37.05); Naive v. Jones, 353 S.W.2d 365, 366 (Ky. 1961). "Wilfulness"
will presumably still play a role in determining the severity of the sanctions imposed
in any given case.
278 See CR 37.02(2).
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(3) a party fails to answer an interrogatory or a request
for production or inspection.27 9
The party seeking discovery may move for an order com-
pelling the discovery sought in the court in which the action is
pending, or on matters relating to a deposition, in "the court
of equivalent jurisdiction in the county where the deposition
is being taken. ' 280 The only downside risk usually faced by
either party at this point is the possibility that the expenses
a successful motion, or the expenses of opposing an unsuc-
cessful motion may be asserted against the losing party.281
Even though CR 37.01(d) provides that expenses, including
attorney's fees, shall be assessed unless the losing party dem-
onstrates that his action was substantially justified, the tenor
of the rule is all too frequently ignored, at least in the author's
experience. While it is true that the language of the rule com-
mits an award of expenses and fees to the discretion of the
trial judge,282 the language of the rule requires the court to
address the issue of abuse.83
In addition to an award of expenses and fees, CR 37.04
provides for other, more substantial measures,
(1) [i]f a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
party or a person designated under Rule 30.02(6) or Rule
31.01(2) to testify on behalf of a party fails (a) to appear
before the officer who is to take his deposition ... or (b) to
serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted
under Rule 33 .. .or (c) to serve a written response to a
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34.284
The court in which the action is pending may order that cer-
279 CR 37.01(b).
280 CR 37.01(a).
211 See CR 37.01(d). On awards of attorney fees against counsel, see Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. at 764-67.
282 See CR 37.01(d)(i)-(ii). Cf. E.I.C., Inc. v. Bank of Va., 582 S.W.2d 72, 75-76
(Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (CR 37.02, which includes sanctions for failure to comply with an
order pursuant to CR 37.01, allows for trial judge's discretion; however, any expenses
awarded must be justified).
18 See CR 37.01(d). Cf. E.I.C., Inc. v. Bank of Va., 582 S.W.2d at 72. As a corol-
lary, the trial judge must state his reasons for imposing sanctions. Wilson v. Volks-
wagon of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 503-05 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020
(1978).
2 CR 37.04(1).
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tain facts be taken as established in accordance with the claim
of the party prevailing on motion; (2) that a party be barred
from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses or
introducing evidence thereon; (3) that pleadings or parts
thereof be stricken;8 5 or (4) that a default be entered against
the recalcitrant party.2 88
Severe discovery sanctions are much more likely to be im-
posed if a party fails to comply with an order obtained pursu-
ant to CR 37.01. CR 37.02 states that a party who fails to obey
an order to provide discovery may be held in contempt 8 7 and
may suffer a variety of penalties including the dismissal of the
case or a default judgment,8 s and an award of expenses, in-
cluding attorney's fees. 289 The severe sanction of default judg-
ment is held to be warranted only in rare circumstances,"'
and a party's statements in explanation of his failure to com-
ply will be accepted as true in the absence of contrary evi-
dence.2 91 However, courts are utilizing the more extreme sanc-
tions with increasing frequency.2 9 2
285 CR 37.02(2)(a)-(c). See Benjamin v. Near E. Rug Co., 535 S.W.2d 848 (Ky.
1976) (striking answer and entering default for failure to answer interrogatories). But
cf. Miller v. Watts, 436 S.W.2d 515 (Ky. 1969) (order to answer interrogatories cou-
pled with the grant of a continuance); Armstrong v. Biggs, 275 S.W.2d 60 (Ky. 1955)
(abuse of discretion not to allow more time). Counsel should consider the malpractice
claims that might arise from such rulings. Barthold, 'Negligence' in Discovery. No
Paper Tiger, 6 LrGATioN, Fall 1979, at 39.
236 CR 37.02(2)(c).
287 See CR 37.02(1) (failure to be sworn or answer a question after being directed
to do so by the court); CR 37.02(2)(d) (contempt penalty for failure to obey any dis-
covery orders, except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination). See
also Annot., 8 A.L.R. 4th 1181 (1981).
Is$ CR 37.02(2)(c). See Nowicke v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 551 S.W.2d 809,
811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
280 CR 37.03 (not just fees for a motion, but for the defense of the entire action).
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. at 764. CR 37.05 provides that expenses and
attorney fees may not be awarded against the Commonwealth. However, that does
not mean that government counsel are immune from the imposition of sanctions.
United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1370-71 (9th Cir.
1980).
110 See Nowicke v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 551 S.W.2d at 811.
291 Id.
212 See, e.g., Penthouse Int'l. Ltd. v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 86 F.R.D. 396
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 663 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1981) (dismissal of action for a variety of
abuses). Cf. G-K Properties v. Redevelopment Agency, 577 F.2d 645, 647 (9th Cir.
1978) (a last minute production of documents will not save the party from the conse-
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While this Article was being written, proposals were
pending to amend the Federal Rules. Those proposals, which
provided a more flexible and objective standard of culpability
for the imposition of discovery sanctions against parties and
counsel, have now been adopted. 93 It is entirely possible that
similar rules may be adopted in Kentucky sometime in the
future.
IX. USE OF DEPOSITIONS AND OTHER DISCOvERY PRODUCT AT
TRIAL
The rules and mechanics relating to the use of deposi-
tions and other discovery product at trial are the subject of
frequent misunderstanding. 2 4 Any discussion of the subject
should begin with the use of depositions.295
quence of his obstructive conduct).
2193 See FRCP 26(g) (effective Aug. 1, 1983), which provides:
(g) Signing of Discovery Requests, Responses, and Objections. Every re-
quest for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party repre-
sented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in
his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not rep-
resented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and
state his address. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certi-
fication that he has read the request, response, or objection, and that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable
inquiry it is:
(1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unrea-
sonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case,
the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or
objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after
the omission is called to the attention of the party making the request, re-
sponse or objection and a party shall not be obligated to take any action
with respect to it until it is signed.
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon mo-
tion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the
certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection
is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the viola-
tion, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
'9 See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 197, at §§ 2141-57.
'95 The following chart summarizes the federal and state rules relating to the use
of depositions.
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A. Substantive Use of a Party's Deposition
A deposition may sometimes be used as substantive evi-
dence, to prove an essential element of a litigant's case at
trial.296 In addition, a deposition may be used to contradict or
impeach the trial testimony of a witness.297 The specific rules
relating to these "uses" are set forth in CR 32.01.
A litigant's right to use deposition testimony for substan-
tive purposes is in part dependent upon the status of the de-
ponent.29 8 For example, CR 32.01(b) provides that "the depo-
sition of a party. . . may be used by an adverse party for any
purpose, ' 2 9 that is, for proof of the matter asserted therein or
for impeachment. This rule is consistent with the admissibil-
ity of party-opponent admissions.300 If the proponent of the
deposition evidence of an adverse party has complied with all
the formalities in the taking, completion and return of the
deposition, or if any defects have been waived, and if the dep-
osition is not otherwise objectionable under the rules of evi-
TAKING AND USE OF DEPOSITIONS - STATE AND FEDERAL*
TAKING USE AT TRIAL
Kentucky Federal
1) Adverse Party- 1) Adverse Party-
Written notice Written notice
CR 30.02 FRCP 30(b)
2) Witness-
Subpoena (45.04)
plus notice to
adverse party
(30.02)
2) Witness-
Subpoena
(45(d)) plus
notice to adverse
party (30(b))
Kentucky
1) impeachment
2) substantive under Jett v.
Commonwealth, 436
S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969)
3) admissions
4) more than 100 miles from
courthouse or out of state
(CR 32.01(c))
5) unavailable in fact - sick,
etc.
6) occupational exemptions
from witness obligation to
attend trial. CR 32.01(c),
45.05
7) some equity actions. CR
43.04 - notably divorce &
judicial sales
8) exceptional circumstances
in the interest of justice
Federal
1) impeachment
2) substantive. FRE
801(d)
3) admissions
4) more than 100 miles
from courthouse or
out of U.S. FRCP
32(a)
5) unavailable in fact
6) exceptional
circumstances in
the interest of
justice. FRCP 32(a)
*Courtesy of Prof. William Fortune, College of Law, University of Kentucky.
298 See CR 32.01.
2 CR 32.01(a).
298 See Blumenkopf, supra note 103, at 248-51.
219 CR 32.01(b) (emphasis added).
100 See White v. Crawford, 346 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Ky. 1961); Schoenbaechler v.
Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 328 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. 1959).
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dence,3 °1 the deposition may be read to the jury, in whole or
in part, as substantive evidence. 2  This may be done while
the adverse party is on the stand, or at some other point in
the litigant's case in chief.3 03 Counsel might proceed as fol-
lows: "Your Honor, at this time I would like to read from Mr.
X's deposition which was taken under oath on - pursuant
to the Civil Rules, with opposing counsel present, beginning at
page - line _ "304 [At this point the judge will presuma-
bly give a standard jury instruction on deposition testimony.]
It must be remembered that the mere filing of a deposition
does not make it part of the record.305 The deposition must be
introduced into evidence in the above manner.3 06
B. Substantive Use of a Nonparty's Deposition
If the deposition is that of a nonparty witness, the use of
deposition testimony as substantive evidence is more re-
stricted. Specifically, the deposition of a nonparty witness
may only be read "for any purpose" if one of twelve condi-
tions has been established.3 0 7 Subsection (i) is by far the most
301 See CR 32.02-32.03. See also Cox v. Louisville, 439 S.W.2d 51, 55 (Ky. 1969).
302 CR 32.01(b). See White v. Crawford, 346 S.W.2d at 310 (introduction of depo-
sitions of an adverse party as substantive evidence has long been recognized).
3 Counsel may read both the questions and answers, or if the adverse party is
not on the stand he may read the questions and have co-counsel or a legal assistant
take the stand to read the answers. See Blumenkopf, supra note 103, at 250-51.
304 C. HOLLEY, supra note 156, at § 4.16 form C.
305 See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 197, at § 2142.
300 See Salsman v. Witt, 466 F.2d 76 (10th Cir. 1972). But see Pfau v. Witcover,
139 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1943) (deposition admitted by implied consent). Cf. Mid-
Southern Toyota Ltd. v. Bug's Imports, Inc., 453 S.W.2d 544, 550 (Ky. 1970) (formal
admission into evidence has no significant purpose in the case of trial by the court, as
distinguished from the case of a jury trial, so long as the parties know that the court
intends to consider the admissions or answers as evidence, and the parties are given
the chance to make objections to its admissibility).
307 Substantive use of a non-party's deposition is allowed if:
(i) [The witness] is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place
where the court sits in which the action is pending or out of the State,
unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party
offering the deposition; or (ii) [The witness] is the Governor, Secretary, Au-
ditor or Treasurer of the State; or (iii) [The witness] is a judge or clerk of
court; or (iv) is a postmaster; or (v) a president, cashier, teller or clerk of a
bank; or (vi) is a practicing physician, dentist or lawyer; or (vii) is a keeper,
officer or guard of a penitentiary; or (viii) is dead; or (ix) is of unsound
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important provision of CR 32.01 since it permits a witness's
deposition testimony to be used as substantive evidence if the
witness "is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place
where the court sits in which the action is pending, or out of
the State."308 If this condition of admissibility is established,
the witness need not have been subpoenaed.3 0 9 The only limi-
tation is that the absence of the witness must not have been
"procured" by the party offering the deposition. "Procured"
has been construed to encompass an unfair and deliberate at-
tempt to cause the witness to absent himself from the trial.310
Assuming that there has been no such collusion, there is no
requirement that the witness live more than 100 miles from
the place of trial.3 11 He need only be 100 miles from the place
of trial when the deposition is offered. 12 However, the court
may inquire into the legitimacy of the witness's absence.313
Under the better view, a party should also be permitted
to offer his own deposition testimony under this rule, if, for
example, he resides more than 100 miles from the place of
trial. 31 4 However, several decisions have held that a party may
mind, having been of sound mind when the deposition was taken; or (x) is
prevented from attending the trial by illness, infirmity or imprisonment; or
(xi) is in the military service of the United States or of this State; or (xii) if
the court finds that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it de-
sirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the dep-
osition to be used.
CR 32.01(c) (emphasis added). Of course, the parties may agree on the use of a depo-
sition in lieu of live testimony. See Stone Coal Corp. v. Varney, 336 S.W.2d 41 (Ky.
1960).
305 The word "is" is italicized to highlight the fact that if the witness is present
at trial, then his deposition may not be used as substantive evidence. See Nanda v.
Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974). See also Higgs' Ex'x v. Higgs' Ex'x, 150
S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1941); Stevens' Adm'r v. Watt, 99 S.W.2d 753 (Ky. 1936) (both deci-
sions pre-rule).
"'= See Mark IV Properties Inc. v. Club Dev. & Management Corp., 12 Bankr.
854, 858 (S.D. Cal. 1981); Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181, 189 (D.
Md. 1962); State v. Long, 344 So. 2d 754, 758-59 (Ala. 1977).
310 See Weiss v. Weiner, 10 F.R.D. 387 (D. Md. 1950).
311 Neckwear Corp. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 275 F.2d 295 (1st Cir. 1960); State v.
Long, 344 So. 2d at 758-59.
313 See generally Annot., 94 A.L.R.2D 1172 (1964).
313 See, e.g., Vevelstad v. Flynn, 230 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1956).
31, See Weiss v. Weiner, 10 F.R.D. at 388; Richmond v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 490, 492
(2d Cir. 1955).
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not be allowed to exercise an option between presenting his
case by deposition or by oral testimony by the simple expedi-
ent of either attending or not attending his trial.315
Because of the ease of transportation in modern times,
and in order to avoid trivial disputes as to which are the ordi-
nary, usual, and shortest routes of travel, the better construc-
tion of the Rule would be that the 100 mile distance from the
courthouse be measured "as the crow flies."316 In addition, the
preference for live testimony should demand that the witness
appear and testify if the location where the witness is regu-
larly working at the time of trial is less than 100 miles from
the courthouse, even though the witness resides more than
100 miles from the place of trial. 17
Assuming that a witness's deposition may be used in lieu
of testimony, 18 the mechanics for its introduction are the
same as have been previously set forth for the deposition of
an adverse party. 19 It should be noted that, although the rule
states that "any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissi-
ble under the rules of evidence. . may be used," 320 it is bet-
ter practice for trial counsel to specify those portions he
deems relevant and to offer only those in evidence. 32 1 CR
32.01(d) provides a safeguard to the adverse party by allowing
him to require the introduction of other parts of the deposi-
tion which ought in fairness to be considered with the party
introduced, 322 or to offer them himself,323 assuming that such
"other parts" are admissible under the rules of evidence. 24
315 See, e.g., Boehm v. Hishmeh, 421 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1967). Cf. Colonial Realty
Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 337 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
318 See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 76 F.R.D. 214, 215 (D. Conn. 1977).
311 See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 16, 18 (D. Conn. 1977).
318 Kentucky cases require a specific finding of unavailability under CR 32.01(c).
See, e.g., Boehm v. Hismeh, 421 S.W.2d at 838; Commonwealth v. Transamerican
Freight Lines, Inc., 388 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Ky. 1965). See also Phelps Roofing Co. v.
Johnson, 368 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Ky. 1963) (trial court allowed reasonable discretion).
31' See text accompanying notes 304-06 supra.
20 CR 32.01.
321 See Pursche v. Atlas Scraper & Eng'g Co., 300 F.2d 467, 488 (9th Cir. 1961).
To avoid unnecessary interruption, counsel should secure in limine rulings on all ob-
jections. Blumenkopf, supra note 106, at 250.
322 See Armstrong v. McGuire, 283 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Ky. 1955).
323 See Thomas v. Gates, 399 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Ky. 1966).
'24 See Long v. Scheffer, 316 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Ky. 1958).
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C. Use of a Deposition for Impeachment Purposes
The deposition of a witness, including a party, may be
used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or im-
peaching the deponent-witness. 25 The proper technique for
using the deposition for this purpose proceeds as follows.
First, the cross-examiner should lock the witness into his
testimony on direct by repeating it to him and securing his
agreement as to its substance, if not the witness's exact lan-
guage . 26 Then counsel should accredit the impeaching vehicle
(the deposition) by asking the following series of questions:
Q: Your deposition was taken in this case on -, correct?
Q: [To a party or represented witness] You were repre-
sented at your deposition by Mr. -, correct?
Q: Your were given the opportunity to read the deposition,
correct?Q:
You were given the opportunity to make corrections to your
testimony, correct?
Q: And you read the deposition, correct?
Q: And you made corrections to that testimony, correct?
Q: And you then signed the deposition before a notary
public, correct?327
After the jury has been suitably impressed with the circum-
stances under which the witness's prior inconsistent statement
was elicited, counsel should then confront the witness with his
former testimony by asking him if the "following question was
asked and the following answer given." Counsel may read the
question and answer himself, or ask the witness to read it. 328
A witness that has been impeached by a prior inconsistent
statement must be confronted with the statement, and be
given an opportunity to explain the inconsistency.329 It should
325 CR 32.01(a).
528 See J. MCELHANEY, TRiAL NOTEBOOK 113-14 (1981).
327 See Blumenkopf, supra note 103, at 249-50. See also C. HOLLEY, supra note
156, at § 4.13. Technically, this catechism need not be followed if the witness is an
adverse party, but it is recommended.
328 Some attorneys recommend the latter technique on the theory that the wit-
ness cannot read and fabricate an explanation for the inconsistency at the same time.
, See CR 43.08. See also Sallee v. Ashlock, 438 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Ky. 1969);
White v. Piles, 589 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
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be remembered that in Kentucky, a witness's prior inconsis-
tent statement is admitted as substantive evidence, as well as
for impeachment.3 0
D. Use of Other Discovery Product at Trial
"Answers [to interrogatories] may be used to the extent
permitted by the rules of evidence." ' 1 They may, therefore,
be admitted against the answering party,332 but may not be
offered by him. 3  They must, in any event, be offered in evi-
dence, in the following manner:
"Your Honor, at this time I wish to publish to the jury
[the party's] sworn responses to interrogatories, served __,
numbers _ . [There being no objection] ...
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, on such a date under
the Civil Rules under which we operate the following ques-
tions were submitted in writing to [the party]. [The party]
answered these questions in writing under oath. I will read
you the question(s) and then the answer(s)." 3 3'
Answers to interrogatories may, of course, also be used to im-
peach a party witness. 335
A party's responses to requests to admit under CR
36.01336 are admitted into evidence and read to the jury in the
same manner as interrogatories. 33
7
330 See Hall v. Hamlin, 484 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1972); Jett v. Commonwealth, 436
S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969). See note 295 supra for a summary chart on the taking and
use of depositions, state and federal.331 CR 33.02(1).
332 See Gridiron Steel Co. v. Jones & Loughlin Steel Corp., 361 F.2d 791, 794
(6th Cir. 1966); Haskell Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Weeks, 237 F.2d 263, 267 (9th
Cir. 1956).
333 Haskell Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Weeks, 237 F.2d at 267.
334 C. HOLLEY, supra note 156, at § 4.16. Filing interrogatories does not place
them in evidence. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 197, at § 2180. See, e.g.,
Zamora v. New Braunfels Indep. School Dist., 362 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
33' See Rediker v. Warfield, 11 F.R.D. 125, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Bailey v. New
England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 F.R.D. 494, 495 (S.D. Cal. 1940).
33" For a discussion of requests to admit see text accompanying notes 235-61
supra.
337 See C. HOLLEY, supra note 156, at § 4.16. It has been held that in a nonjury
case formal admission is not necessary if both parties know the court intends to con-
sider the admissions or answers as evidence and are afforded an opportunity to object
to their admissibility. Mid-Southern Toyota, Ltd. v. Bug's Imports, Inc., 453 S.W.2d
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X. DISCOVERY REFORM: SPECIAL RULES OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR THE ECONOMICAL LITIGATION DOCKET
Dissenting from the adoption of several 1980 amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Justice Powell
opined: "Lawyers devote an enormous number of 'chargeable
hours' to the practice of discovery .... [A]ll too often, dis-
covery practices enable the party with greater financial re-
sources to prevail by exhausting the resources of a weaker op-
ponent.338 Most of the attention given to problems of delay
and discovery abuse in federal and state courts in recent years
has been generated by instances of outright suppression of
discoverable evidence.33 9 Many of these abuses can be dealt
with adequately by a sanctioning mechanism.3 40 The more
troublesome problems may be
attributed to counsel who use discovery for fishing expedi-
tions,. . . who delay completion of discovery, and who force
undue expense on opposing counsel by extensive interroga-
tories, by requests for production of unnecessarily large
numbers of documents, and by production of documents in
large, unorganized lots in response to interrogatories and
production requests.3 11
As one commentator noted, it is much more difficult to
identify and regulate excessive discovery than it is to identify
and deter unjustified resistance to discovery.
It is exceedingly difficult to legislate or make effective
rules against overkill. Who is to say that two depositions or
ten are excessive in the context of a given action? A case
involving a relatively small amount may be very important
to either of the parties because of its potential as
precedent. 3 2
544 (Ky. 1970).
33, 446 U.S. 997, 1000 (1980) (Powel, J., dissenting). Justices Stewart and Rehn-
quist joined in the dissent.
39 See generally Underwood, supra note 50, at 625.
340 See id. at 629.
341 Cohn, Federal Discovery: A Survey of Local Rules and Practices in View of
Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules, 63 MINN. L. REv. 253, 255 (1978-79).
312 See Krupp, Rule 37: Sanctions for Discovery Resistance, 7 LITIGATION, Spring
1981, at 32, 60.
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Presumably in response to persistent claims of discovery
abuse, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has adopted the ex-
perimental Special Rules of the Circuit Court for the Econom-
ical Litigation Docket,3 43 to be applied "only in those circuits
or divisions thereof specified by order of the Supreme
Court. 3 44 These rules limit the number of depositions and in-
terrogatories that may be employed in a case and emphasize a
greater role for the judicial officer in controlling and expedit-
ing discovery, 45 thereby introducing preventive as opposed to
a wholly sanctions-oriented approach to the problem of "too
much" discovery. For convenience of reference, the Special
Rules are set forth here in their entirety.
SPECIAL RULES OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE ECONOMICAL
LITIGATION DOCKET
Rule 88. Scope of Rules Relating to the Economical Litiga-
tion Docket
Rules 89 through 97 shall apply only in those circuits or
divisions thereof specified by order of the Supreme Court.
Rule 89. Economical Litigation Docket
(1) The economical litigation docket shall consist of all
cases falling substantially within the following categories:
(a) contracts;
(b) personal injury;
(c) property damages;
(d) property rights;
(e) termination of parental rights.
(2) Practice and procedure for cases on the economical
litigation docket shall be governed by Rules 1 through 87
and the local rules of the trial court except as modified by
Rules 89 through 97 relating to the economical litigation
docket.
Rule 90. Discovery and Status Conference
(1) A discovery and status conference shall be held in
each case for the purpose of scheduling each event in the
case and determining the period of time necessary to com-
'M' For a survey of the new rules see Note, Economical Litigation: Kentucky's
Answer to High Costs and Delay in Civil Litigation, 71 Ky. L.J. 647 (1982-83).
3, See CR 88. The Special Rules are published in KENTucKY RuLES OF COURT
1984 DESK COPY (1983).
-"5 See CR 90, 93.01-.02.
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plete discovery. The conference shall be set within fifteen
(15) days after service of the last responsive pleading or the
last day a responsive pleading could have been served. A
date for pretrial conference shall be set for a date not more
than sixty (60) days following the discovery and status con-
ference and a trial date shall be set not more than thirty
(30) days after the pretrial conference. However, in the dis-
cretion of the trial judge these times may be extended or
reduced to meet the needs of the individual case.
(2) Motions for exceptions to the rules of the economi-
cal litigation docket relating to discovery must be made at
the discovery and status conference.
(3) All parties shall be represented at the discovery and
status conference and shall be prepared to have firm dates
set for the pretrial conference and the trial.
Official Commentary: The discovery and status conference is
essentially a planning conference. It is at this meeting with
all the parties and the trial judge that the progress of dis-
covery is planned, the period necessary to complete discov-
ery established and the date for the pretrial conference set.
CR 90 appears to embody the philosophy of new FRCP
26(f), which was adopted in 1980. The discovery conference
provides a mechanism for avoiding the "natural weaknesses"
of the old "protective order" system ("piecemeal presentation
of problems, delay of judicial rulings, and inadequacy of sanc-
tions") by allowing the court to intervene at an early stage
and insure that discovery will proceed in an orderly and eco-
nomical fashion.3 4 6
Rule 91. Telephone Conferences
At the discretion of the trial judge, any motion may be
heard and any conference may be held by a telephone con-
ference call among the trial judge and counsel for the re-
spective parties.
Rule 92. Motions; Enlargement of Time; Summary
Judgment
(1) Except as provided in Rule 91, motions respecting
cases on the economical litigation docket shall be heard at
the court's regular motion hour.
346 See Recommendations of the American College of Trial Lawyers on Major
Issues Affecting Complex Litigation, 90 F.R.D. 207, 221-25 (1981).
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(2) Motions for enlargement of time or continuances
shall state the reasons therefore and will be granted only for
good cause. Agreed orders pertaining to such matters will
not be accepted.
(3) Motions for summary judgment must be made (10)
days prior to the pretrial conference.
Rule 93. Discovery
Rule 93.01. Depositions
Depositions are permitted as a matter of parties only.
The plaintiff shall be required to give his deposition before
any other discovery takes place unless the defendant elects
not to examine the plaintiff or the court otherwise directs.
Except as otherwise ordered by the court, a deposition of a
witness shall be permitted only if it will be introduced at
trial according to the provisions of Rule 32.01.
Official Commentary: The taking of depositions is restricted
by this rule. Depositions are to be taken only of parties and
of witnesses who will not appear at trial and whose deposi-
tions may be introduced under the provisions of Rule 32.01.
The plaintiff is required to give his deposition before any
other discovery in order to give the defendant the opportu-
nity to examine the plaintiff regarding the merits of the
cause of action. Motions for exceptions to Rule 92 must be
raised at the discovery and status conference.
CR 93.01 is extraordinary, inasmuch as most claims of
discovery abuse have arisen from the use of interrogatories
and requests to produce. The rule appears to limit the availa-
bility of depositions taken for the sake of facilitating impeach-
ment and cross-examination, contemplating that nonparty
depositions be taken only if they will be used in lieu of testi-
mony under CR 32.01(c). 47 Presumably, the rule is aimed at
attorneys who depose every witness, whether the deposition is
necessary or not, perhaps to wear down an impecunious oppo-
nent. In addition, the rule prescribes a new and rigid priority
for the taking of depositions. 48 It is submitted that a better
approach to "too much" discovery is provided in amended
37 See CR 93.01. For a different reading of the Rule see Note, supra note 343, at
658-59.
"I See CR 93.01. Compare CR 93.01 with CR 26.02 and FRCP 26(d) (only Spe-
cial Rule imposes priority rules).
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Federal Rule 26(b). 49
Rule 93.02 Interrogatories
The scope and manner of discovery by means of inter-
rogatories shall be governed by Rule 33, except that the in-
terrogatories to any party shall not exceed twenty (20) in
number, each of which shall be limited to a single question.
The suggesion that abuses of "wall-street interrogatories"
be curbed by a rule limiting interrogatories to an artifical
number is hardly new.
Rule 93.03 Production of Documents and Things and Entry
upon Land for Inspection and Other Purposes
Procedures respecting the production of documents and
things and entry upon land for inspection and other pur-
poses shall be as provided in Rule 34, except that notwith-
standing the provisions of Rule 34.02(2), the party upon
whom the request is served shall permit the inspection or
copying of documents or other things or allow the entry
upon land as the case might be within fifteen (15) days after
service unless an objection is filed within that period. If ob-
jection is made to part of an item or category, the part shall
be specified. The party submitting the request may move for
an order under Rule 37.01 with respect to any objection to
or other failure to respond to the request or any part thereof
or any failure to permit inspection as requested.
Official Commentary: Rules 93.02 and 93.03 are for the pur-
pose of expediting discovery. They provide for the prompt
exchange, access and inspection of evidence and for the
prompt appearance for examination. Only upon objection is
319 FRCP 26(b) provides:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdi-
vision (a) may be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery
sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or obtainable from some
other source that is either more convenient, less burdensome, or less expen-
sive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discov-
ery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the discovery is
unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the amount
in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initia-
tive after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under subdivision (c).
See Control Data Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 87 F.R.D.
377 (D.D.C. 1980). But see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3101(a)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1983)
(limiting depositions of non-parties).
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the court called upon to intervene.
Rule 93.04 Exchange of Information
(1) Not later than ten (10) days prior to the pretrial
conference each party shall disclose the following material to
all other parties with a copy to the court:
(a) Name, address and telephone number of any witness
whom the party may call at trial together with a copy of any
statement of such person or if there is not such statement, a
summary of the testimony the person is expected to give.
(b) A description, drawing or photograph of any physical ev-
idence which is to be presented at trial.
(c) A copy of any document or writing which is to be
presented at trial.
(d) A brief summary of the qualifications of any expert wit-
ness the party may call at trial together with a report or
statement of any such expert witness which sets forth the
subject matter of the expert witness' anticipated testimony;
the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert
is expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for
each opinion.
(e) A statement summarizing each contention in support of
every claim or defense which the party will present at trial
and a brief statement of the facts upon which the conten-
tions are based.
(f) Offers of stipulation.
(g) A concise statement of each issue of law and each issue
of fact recognized by the party.
(2) Each party is under a continuing duty promptly to
supplement all prior discovery or pretrial disclosures ren-
dered pursuant to this Rule 93.04 with any pertinent after-
acquired information.
(3) Parties are required to refine issues that are to be
tried in the case. If an order of stipulation is rejected and
the matter is subsequently proved at trial, the rejecting
party shall be subject to sanctions according to Rule 96.
Official Commentary: The Economical Litigation Docket is
intended to promote prompt and inexpensive discovery. By
the exchange of the information outlined in Rule 93.04, both
objectives are attained. The emphasis is on free exchange of
information between counsel as opposed to the more expen-
sive and time-consuming adversarial discovery proceedings
such as deposition. The exchange of this information prior
to the pretrial conference should promote the narrowing of
[Vol. 72
DISCOvERY IN KENTUCKY
issues and encourage settlements.
CR 93.03 speeds up the procedures for the production of
documents, although it is unclear whether its time limits are
workable when a request to produce accompanies or follows
close on the heels of the complaint. CR 93.03 and CR 93.04
appear to be aimed at providing a mechanism for automatic,
mandatory discovery similar to what has been available in
England since 1965.350 In addition, CR 93.04 is consistent with
certain proposals that we modify our "adversary" model to
provide more (and more "civil") discovery. 5 Some of its sub-
divisions appear sensible. For example, although nonparty
witness statements are trial preparation materials that may
not be discovered absent a showing of substantial hardship,35 2
a nonparty witness may obtain his own statement under CR
26.02(3)(b). Since he may do so at the urging of a party, the
first clause of CR 93.04(1)(a) is not particularly radical.3 53 On
the other hand, one might question the utility of rules which
cut too deeply into "work product"3 54 and place too great a
burden on counsel, by requiring counsel to supplement all dis-
covery responses, and conduct, in essence, a pretrial trial.3 55
Along the same lines, the new rule may ultimately lead to an
increase in collateral "litigation" involving the enforcement of
its provisions, unrelated to the merits of the case. 56
350 See J. LEviNE, supra note 67, at 19-21.
351 See generally Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA.
L. RE v. 1031 (1974-75).
352 CR 26.02(3)(a).
353 The same may be said of CR 93.04(1)(d). Compare id. with CR 26.02(4)(a)-
(b).
35 The second clause of CR 93.04(1)(a), dealing with summary of testimony, is
one example of such a rule.
35 See McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1976) (striking down a local
rule governing pretrial that was overly complicated and burdensome). CR 93.04(1)(e)
not only threatens to swallow the "work-product privilege," but is also unduly bur-
densome and unenforceable. CR 93.04(2) attempts to sweep aside the balanced ap-
proach to supplementation of responses contained in CR 26(e). Similarly, one might
ask how, as a practical matter, costs are to be apportioned under subsection CR
93.04(3). See note 257 supra for discussion of this in the context of requests to admit.
356 Cf. Rosenberg, Discovery Abuse, 7 LrGATION, Spring 1981, at 8. "What
haunts me is the possibility that we are just breeding a lot of lawsuits by trying to
enforce the procedural regulations through elaborate sanctioning mechanisms, which
themselves breed lawsuits." Id. at 9.
1983-841
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Rule 94. Certificate of Compliance
A certificate of compliance with Rule 93 shall be filed
by each party upon the completion of discovery.
Official Commentary: This rule merely requires a simple cer-
tification (one sentence will suffice) that the special rules
have been followed. An AOC form may be obtained from the
court.
CR 94 dovetails FRCP 26(g), which provides that coun-
sel's signature on a discovery request or response constitutes a
certificate and the basis for sanctions for noncompliance.
However, the Kentucky Rule does not provide any test for as-
sessing compliance and attorney "culpability."
3 5
Rule 95. Pretrial Conference
A pretrial conference shall be scheduled in all cases at
the discovery and status conference. The pretrial conference
shall be for the purpose of:
(a) Simplifying the issues and agreeing upon the issues
of law and upon the issues of fact to be tried.
(b) Exploring the possibility of settlement.
(c) Disposing of all remaining motions.
(d) Considering amendments to pleadings.
(e) Exploring possible admissions of fact and docu-
ments that will avoid unnecessary proof.
(f) Limiting the number of expert witnesses.
(g) Any other matter that will aid in disposition of the
case.
Official Commentary: The pretrial conference is substan-
tially for the same purpose as in any other case, and the
purpose of this rule is to make it mandatory in each case.
Additional emphasis is directed toward agreement on the
issues to be tried.
CR 95 returns to the notion that pretrials are helpful, and
should be mandatory in all cases.
Rule 96. Sanctions
If a party fails to comply with Rules 88 through 97, the
trial judge may impose as appropriate any of the sanctions
specified in Rule 37.02, in the same manner as if an order of
Compare CR 94 with FRCP 26(g). The text of FRCP 26(g) is set out in note
293 supra.
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the court had been violated.
Official Commentary: It is anticipated that the sanctions will
be principally those prescribed in Rule 37.02(3), which pro-
vides, "in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey the
order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the rea-
sonable expenses, including attorneys fees, caused by the
failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substan-
tially justified or that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
CR 96 provides a basis for imposing sanctions on parties
or their attorneys, or both, for noncompliance, and is consis-
tent with the deterrence-oriented approach to discovery abuse
developed in recent cases.358
Rule 97. Presence of Counsel
Trial counsel of record must be present in order to
make binding stipulations and set firm hearing dates at all
hearings. Alternate counsel may be designated only if that
counsel is empowered to stipulate on matters and has coun-
sel of record's office calendar information so that he may
firmly bind counsel of record in event-setting and other
decisions.
CR 97 is a laudatory rule which prevents trial counsel
from aborting otherwise meaningful conferences by sending
associates who are unfamiliar with the litigation, or who lack
authority to participate effectively, to pretrial or discovery
conferences.
dONCLUSION
This Article is intended to serve as an introduction to, as
well as a quick reference to, civil discovery rules and proce-
dures in the Kentucky courts. It not only should prove useful
to the practitioner and student, but also should serve to illus-
trate the fact that although there is a rough parity between
federal and state discovery practices, there are "local" rules
and procedures that are worthy of attention. Moreover, it can
318 For a discussion of the potential impact of new and more liberal sanctioning
mechanisms see Underwood, supra note 50, at 660-67.
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be seen that the Supreme Court of Kentucky has shown a
willingness to break free of the federal model, at least on an
experimental basis, with a view to bringing about much
needed reform of pretrial procedures.
